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THE SURVEILLANCE GAP: 
THE HARMS OF EXTREME PRIVACY AND DATA 
MARGINALIZATION 
 
MICHELE GILMAN∞ AND REBECCA GREEN∞∞ 
ABSTRACT 
We live in an age of unprecedented surveillance, enhanced by modern 
technology, prompting some to suggest that privacy is dead. Previous scholarship 
suggests that no subset of the population feels this phenomenon more than 
marginalized communities. Those who rely on public benefits, for example, must 
turn over personal information and submit to government surveillance far more 
routinely than wealthier citizens who enjoy greater opportunity to protect their 
privacy and the ready funds to secure it. This article illuminates the other end of 
the spectrum, arguing that many individuals who may value government and 
nonprofit services and legal protections fail to enjoy these benefits because they 
reside in a “surveillance gap.” These people include undocumented immigrants, 
day laborers, homeless persons, and people with felony conviction 
histories suffering collateral consequences of their convictions. Members of these 
groups often remain outside of the mainstream data flows and institutional 
attachments necessary to flourish in American society. The harms that 
surveillance gap residents experience can be severe, such as physical and mental 
health injuries and lack of economic stability, as well as data marginalization and 
resulting invisibility to policymakers. In short, having too much privacy can be as 
injurious as having too little. 
The sources of the surveillance gap range from attempts to contain and control 
marginalized groups to data silos to economic exploitation. This article explores 
the boundaries of the surveillance gap, evaluates how this emerging concept fits 
within existing privacy paradigms and theoretical frameworks, and suggests 
possible solutions to enhance the autonomy and dignity of marginalized people 
within the surveillance gap. 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although we live in a highly surveilled society, some people among us are 
functionally invisible. For example, low-wage workers—many of whom are 
undocumented immigrants—toil out of sight in an underground economy. A lack 
of a conventional paper trail or pay stub system linking workers to employers 
exposes these workers to potential wage theft and dangerous working conditions.1 
While these workers are perilously out of reach of government and nonprofit 
organizations that could otherwise provide assistance,2  they are also subject to 
heightened forms of surveillance, typically under the increasingly watchful eye of 
agencies like Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Likewise, homeless 
persons’ lives are defined by extremes: although they tend to live their lives in 
public, they are simultaneously governed by laws that criminalize their behavior, 
steadily pushing them out of view. Tellingly, when former Governor of Virginia 
Terry McAuliffe sought to restore the ability to vote to constituents who had 
committed felony crimes, his office was unable to find thousands of people—
people who at one point spent time in the prison and parole systems where their 
whereabouts were always known to authorities.3 These examples illustrate that 
 
1. See Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 
659–60 (2014) (“A coarse definition of day labor is temporary work in which the work, and often 
the workers, lack documentation.”). 
2. Infra Part II.B. 
3. See Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E. 2d 706, 710 (2016) (“McAuliffe’s Executive Order stated 
that it removed the political disabilities of approximately 206,000 Virginians who had been 
convicted of a felony but who had completed their sentences of incarceration and any periods of 
supervised release, including probation and parole.”); ACLU OF VA., ACLU OF VIRGINIA 
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marginalized people experience privacy differently than most Americans. 
Specifically, they experience privacy extremes—being seen or tracked too much 
or too little. 
Existing privacy scholarship has largely focused on the harms derived from 
too little privacy, and, in this vein, several scholars have highlighted the 
particularly intense surveillance of low-income people.4 This article examines the 
other end of the spectrum—the surveillance gap. Life in the surveillance gap can 
be isolating, stigmatizing, dangerous, and harmful to a person’s physical and 
mental health. For one, legal protections available to other members of society 
remain out of reach to those in the surveillance gap. People also lose out on 
potential sources of economic and social support, because those who seek to 
provide services to disadvantaged members of our society often find it nearly 
impossible to reach them. Moreover, those who fall within the surveillance gap 
are not included within big data streams that ultimately shape public policy, thus 
leaving out their experiences and needs from the calculus that goes into creating 
policy.5 Frustratingly, the challenges facing these groups remain invisible, further 
entrenching these groups’ marginalization. 
The surveillance gap has multiple causes, ranging from data silos to poor data 
sharing, and from benign neglect to administrative systems that purposefully 
exclude certain people. This article seeks to identify and understand the causes, 
contours, and consequences of the surveillance gap and to outline legal and policy 
tools for addressing it. Part II provides case studies of populations living in the 
surveillance gap, including undocumented immigrants, day laborers, homeless 
persons, and people with felony conviction histories. Part III situates the 
surveillance gap within several scholarly streams. First, it assesses the surveillance 
gap through the lens of scholarship that differentiates between privacy harms 
experienced by varying groups. Second, it builds on insights from feminist legal 
theory involving the public/private binary and the harms associated with having 
too much privacy, wrestling with the tensions identified by feminists between 
 
CHALLENGES GOVERNOR MCDONNELL TO RESTORE VOTING RIGHTS TO GREATEST NUMBER POSSIBLE 
(June 25, 2013), https://acluva.org/en/press-releases/aclu-virginia-challenges-governor-mcdonnell-
restore-voting-rights-greatest-number [https://perma.cc/J9AK-L4E5] (noting that over 350,000 
disenfranchised Virginians awaited restoration of their rights). 
4. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 
1389, 1392–95 (2012) [hereinafter Class Differential]; Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: 
Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEM. 317, 331–32 (2014); Kaaryn Gustafson, 
Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 
312–21 (2013); see generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH 
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017) (describing how digital data collection and 
algorithmic decision-making processes target and harm the poor); KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE 
POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017) (describing how poor mothers in the United States lack a right 
to privacy); JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE AND THE LIMITS 
OF PRIVACY (2001) (describing the hyper-surveillance and lack of privacy rights of a population of 
women on public assistance in rural Appalachia). 
5. DANIEL CASTRO, CTR. ON DATA INNOVATION, THE RISE OF DATA POVERTY IN AMERICA (Sept. 
10, 2014), http://www2.datainnovation.org/2014-data-poverty.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7Y7-FB7Q]. 
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liberalism’s ideals and individuals’ lived realities. Third, it examines notions of 
“choice” and “consent” in consumer and criminal privacy law, testing whether 
such frameworks are meaningful with regard to marginalized groups. Fourth, it 
adds a new dimension to emerging concepts of privacy as contextual. Fifth, it 
reviews fundamental rights theory’s impact on the surveillance gap, positing that 
the gap cannot be found in legal regimes that view privacy as a fundamental 
human right, such as in the European Union. Part IV suggests ways to address 
harms that arise in the surveillance gap while also respecting desirable forms of 
privacy and the dignity and autonomy of marginalized persons. 
II. 
LIFE WITHIN THE SURVEILLANCE GAP 
The rise of the surveillance state is well documented.6 Both state and non-
state institutions routinely record individual actions to an unprecedented degree. 
Americans have famously been warned: “[p]rivacy is dead, get over it.”7 The so-
called death of privacy stems from two main sources. First are the increasingly 
sophisticated tools that the government uses to monitor and track the populace. 
Fear of the government’s abuse of these tools has prompted some federal and state 
laws to protect Americans’ privacy,8 although government surveillance at all 
levels is ever expanding and broader than most people realize.9 The second source 
derives from the private sector. To say that companies have come to appreciate 
the value of consumer data is a gross understatement. Companies now regularly 
collect, aggregate, buy, and sell consumer data on virtually every aspect of 
people’s lives, including buying preferences, health status, criminal and voting 
histories, and physical whereabouts.10 For the modern citizen, this level of 
surveillance can be a form of control; it can be benign, helpful, or harmful, often 
 
6. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977); 
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETY (2001); Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRITISH 
J. SOC. 605 (2000). 
7. See Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 7, 18 (2013) (discussing source of the quote); 
see also Mary Kay Mallonee & Eugene Scott, Comey: ‘There Is No Such Thing as Absolute Privacy 
in America’, CNN (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/politics/james-comey-privacy-
cybersecurity/index.html [https://perma.cc/F6XG-9ULF]; Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s 
Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy Is Over, READWRITEWEB (Jan. 9, 2010, 9:25 PM), 
https://readwrite.com/2010/01/09/facebooks_zuckerberg_says_the_age_of_privacy_is_ov/ [https:
//perma.cc/T5S7-NKDK]. 
8. See, e.g., the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12, 
3121–26 (2012)), and their state equivalents. 
9. See generally JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: MODERN SURVEILLANCE, WHY 
YOU SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 9–26 (2017). 
10. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE (2004).  
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depending on the perspective of the surveilled.11 Increasingly, large-scale data 
sharing between different levels of government and private industry blurs 
public/private distinctions. For instance, marketers build profiles of Americans 
using data from public databases and individual online browsing histories, while 
government agencies such as law enforcement purchase predictive analytic 
systems from private companies, which build their algorithms using combined 
public and private sources of data.12 Together, government and private-sector 
surveillance have created the sense that Americans are universally tracked and that 
few—except those living purposely “off the grid”—are able to evade government 
or private-sector surveillance. 
While this lack of privacy has raised increasingly vocal concerns, the 
contemporary phenomenon of non-surveillance—that is, systemic invisibility of 
large portions of certain classes of people living in the United States—has received 
less attention. We call this the “surveillance gap,” although we acknowledge that 
the term is imperfect. While the concept of surveillance is commonly associated 
with government control of its citizenry, some of the harms that we identify occur 
in the private sphere. Indeed, we adopt a broader notion of “surveillance” 
altogether, including all “focused, systematic, routine attention to personal details 
for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction.”13 This article 
thus tracks gaps within a variety of public and private surveillance systems, some 
of which overlap. We address our attentions to populations that remain outside 
seemingly omnipresent surveillance systems.14 The surveillance gap is a condition 
of invisibility in relation to mainstream society, as well as a difference in how 
marginalized groups experience privacy. 
The phenomenon of “the uncounted” is not new. For decades, certain groups 
have been left out of this country’s most basic counting exercise: the U.S. Census. 
Since its inception, the census has suffered from not just inaccuracies, but also 
what is referred to as the “differential undercount,” or the routine counting of some 
classes of people more accurately than others.15 Historically, the classes of 
 
11. For instance, consider Americans’ split reactions to Edward Snowden’s leaks about 
National Security Agency surveillance of Americans’ phone records. See Orin Kerr, Edward 
Snowden’s Impact, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/04/09/edward-snowdens-impact [https://perma.cc/3EJQ-V45X]. 
12. Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and Big 
Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 63, 104–07 (2017). 
13. DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 14 (2007). 
14. By “gap” we do not refer to a space that must be bridged—indeed, for many individuals, 
the surveillance gap provides a crucial coping mechanism and resistance against oppression. As we 
discuss infra Part IV, the solution for the surveillance gap is not increased surveillance, but rather 
opportunities for marginalized groups to exercise greater autonomy and enhance their dignity. 
15. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Safavian, Down for the Count: The Constitutional, Political and 
Policy Related Problems of Census Sampling, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 477, 477–78 (2000) (discussing 
problems associated with statistical sampling in the U.S. Census); Shane T. Stansbury, Making Sense 
of the Census: The Decennial Census Debate and Its Meaning for America’s Ethnic and Racial 
Minorities, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 404 (2000) (documenting the problem of census 
“undercounts” and the disproportionate impact on racial and ethnic minorities). 
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individuals who have received a less accurate count included children, renters, 
residents of large cities, and racial minorities.16 This differential undercount is the 
census equivalent to the surveillance gap. In recent years, the Census Bureau has 
been forthright about such data collection problems for certain groups, even 
identifying in a 2016 report a list of groups that present the greatest challenge to 
its data collection efforts.17 The Census Bureau uses statistical extrapolation to 
“count” many who fall in one or more of these categories.18 
Data marginalization in the U.S. Census has real consequences for policy-
making in this country, because it impacts federal and state resource allocation, 
environmental priorities, and even the power of the ballot.19 The federal 
government uses census data to allocate hundreds of billions of dollars each 
year.20 Education, welfare, transportation, and a myriad of other federal programs 
allocate funds based on census figures.21 A perfect example of this reality relates 
to the core purpose of the U.S. Census: apportionment, or the allocation, based on 
 
16. Nathaniel Persily, Color By Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85 MINN. 
L. REV. 899, 910 (2000). For an excellent history of the U.S. Census, see PETER SKERRY, COUNTING 
ON THE CENSUS? RACE, GROUP IDENTITY, AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS (2000). 
17. The full list of categories includes: children, homeless people, lower-income individuals, 
those with lower education, non-English-speaking people and/or people who do not have social 
security numbers, members of racial or ethnic minorities, people who do not have smart phone or 
Internet access, older individuals, people who live in rural areas, persons with disabilities, people 
who are angry with the government, and people who live in group quarters. See Memorandum from 
Director John H. Thompson to Chair Ditas Katague, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau 
(Oct. 26, 2016), https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/reports/2016-10-responses-admin_internet-
wg.pdf [https://perma.cc/X84J-QP8B]. 
18. For a fascinating article on the legal battles surrounding, inter alia, statistical sampling in 
the U.S. Census, see Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom 
to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755 (2011). 
19. See Marisa Hotchkiss & Jessica Phelan, Uses of Census Bureau Data in Federal Funds 
Distribution: A New Design for the 21st Century, CENSUS.GOV (Sept. 2017), https://www2.census. 
gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/program-management/working-papers/Uses-of-Census-
Bureau-Data-in-Federal-Funds-Distribution.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9JT-YTZ6] (illustrating in 
Table 1 the billions of dollars allocated to programs such as Head Start, Low Income Energy 
Assistance, and Voting Access for Individuals with Disabilities). 
20. See ANDREW REAMER, COUNTING FOR DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF THE DECENNIAL CENSUS IN 
THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL FUNDS 1 (Brookings Inst. ed., 2010), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0309_census_report.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/R663-S358] (“In FY2008, 215 federal domestic assistance programs used census-related data to 
guide the distribution of $446.7 billion, 31% of all federal assistance. Census-guided grants 
accounted for $419.8 billion, 75% of all federal grant funding.”). For a more recent version of this 
data, see ANDREW REAMER, COUNTING FOR DOLLARS 2020: THE ROLE OF THE DECENNIAL CENSUS IN 
THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL FUNDS (George Washington Inst. of Pub. Policy ed., 
2017), https://gwipp.gwu.edu/counting-dollars-role-decennial-census-geographic-distribution-
federal-funds [https://perma.cc/HF8H-4YTW]. 
21. See Samuel Issacharoff & Allan J. Lichtman, The Census Undercount and Minority 
Representation: The Constitutional Obligation of the States to Guarantee Equal Representation, 13 
REV. LITIG. 1, 29 (1993) (citing Abe L. Frank, The 1990 Census: Its Effects on Allocation of Federal 
Funds to State and Local Governments, ELECTION CTR. REP. 1 (Apr. 15, 1988)); Hotchkiss & Phelan, 
supra note 19, at 9 (“The 2000 Census short form was designed to collect basic demographic and 
housing information . . . to be used for apportionment and redistricting.”). 
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a state’s population size, of representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
When, as is routinely the case, populations are regularly left out of the count, those 
populations are, by definition, under-represented. As Samuel Issacharoff and 
Allan Lichtman explain, “[i]t is evident that problems surrounding the 
undercounting of identifiable groups have predictable political consequences . . . 
The undercount results in the underrepresentation of areas of minority 
concentration, particularly inner-city neighborhoods, to the benefit of wealthier 
suburban and some rural areas.”22 
The “undercount” problem—and controversy over how best to cure it—has 
consistently plagued census data.23 In the lead-up to the 2020 Census, the Census 
Bureau convened a working group focused on improving counting of “Hard to 
Count” (HTC) groups.24 The working group considered (1) making greater use of 
local data and imagery, (2) encouraging respondents to use the Internet and 
telephone, and (3) using administrative records and third-party private-sector 
databases.25 Tellingly, the working group ultimately recommended against using 
third-party databases and administrative records to find HTC populations, citing 
“racialized disparities” in those databases to conclude that they might exacerbate 
the problem.26 Mistrust and fear of government, particularly in minority and 
 
22. Issacharoff & Lichtman, supra note 21, at 4. 
23. See Persily, The Law of the Census, supra note 18, at 758–69 (discussing “‘Sampling,’ 
Imputation, and the Undercount” and detailing groups historically undercounted). 
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS, 
INTERNET, AND HARD TO COUNT WORKING GROUP FOR THE 2020 CENSUS FINAL REPORT (2016), 
https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/reports/2016-07-admin_internet-wg-report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HN59-RCVX]. 
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH-RISK SERIES: PROGRESS ON MANY HIGH-RISK 
AREAS WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON OTHERS, No. GAO-17-375T, 42 (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682787.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SFJ-6EH2]. 
26. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS AND THIRD 
PARTY DATA USE IN THE 2020 CENSUS WORKING GROUP FINAL REPORT 9 (2014), https://www
2.census.gov/cac/nac/reports/2014_2020census_wg.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFJ3-2TEL] (“The 
currently available and/or tested government administrative records (AR) exacerbate racialized 
disparities in the quality of data available to the Census Bureau. Such racialized disparities may be 
attributed to both ‘coverage’ issues and ‘response’ issues in the AR databases’ quality. Such 
administrative records databases better ‘cover’ the White population than racial minority populations 
and are also more likely to produce cross-database response agreement for the White population than 
for racial minority populations.”). The working group also acknowledged that the census’s use of 
administrative or other third-party records might violate the privacy interests of people who had 
shared their data with third parties: 
Individuals disclose information within a particular purpose or context with rules 
in mind at the time of disclosure. When interacting with a firm, a website, another 
individual, individuals reveal information with an understanding as to who can 
see that information, how it might be used, and the context in which it is revealed. 
Disclosure of information is not synonymous with information being public—
disclosure is done within expectations of privacy. 
Id. at 10. 
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immigrant communities, seem likely to create additional problems for the count 
in 2020.27 
Putting the undercount dilemma aside, this section examines several 
populations that evade, avoid, or (by design) fall outside the surveillance radar and 
discusses why. Though people living in the surveillance gap suffer differing 
experiences and harms, the case studies discussed below reveal several 
commonalities. First, the surveillance gap impacts some of the most marginalized 
and politically powerless groups in American society—undocumented people, day 
laborers, homeless persons, and people with felony conviction histories. Second, 
just as surveillance is used as a tool to “exert influence and reproduce power 
relations,” the surveillance gap can also serve as a social control mechanism.28 
Torin Monahan explains that, when it comes to oppressed populations, 
“surveillance plays an important role in policing bodies and maintaining 
boundaries between inside and outside, self and other.”29 In other words, careful 
watching plays a social sorting function.30 The same can be said of the extreme 
privacy that characterizes the surveillance gap. Third, people resist surveillance 
systems in subtle and empowering ways,31 quietly reclaiming their humanity and 
asserting their rights. Fourth, people in the surveillance gap often lack 
fundamental legal rights or access to remedies that protect rights. 
 
27. See Hansi Lo Wang, Run-Up to 2020 Census Raises Concerns over Security and Politics, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/28
/521789446/run-up-to-census-2020-raises-concerns-over-security-and-politics [https://perma.cc 
/R5K9-PE36] (“[The] Census Bureau is facing its longtime challenge of building up public trust. 
Kenneth Prewitt, a former director of the Census Bureau who served under the Clinton 
administration, says he’s concerned that the immigration debate could determine the questions asked 
on the Census.”); Danny Vinik, Trump’s Threat to the 2020 Census, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/04/trumps-threat-to-the-2020-census-000404 [https: 
//perma.cc/C7DK-RVEC] (“‘If you imagine that the federal government is asking for personal 
information and you feel that the federal government is hostile and that if you were to answer this, 
perhaps they would use this against you,’ said Terry Ao Minnis, director of the census and voting 
programs at Asian Americans Advancing Justice.”). Some believe that traditionally undercounted 
communities will be particularly aggressive advocates for getting counted in the 2020 round. See, 
e.g., Nick Visser, The U.S. Won’t Tally LGBT People in 2020 Census, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 
2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-census-lgbt-americans_us_58db3894e4b0cb23e65 
c6cd9 [https://perma.cc/5E4E-PALJ] (suggesting that undercounted groups plan to fight for their 
representation). 
28. Torin Monahan, Regulating Belonging: Surveillance, Inequality, and the Cultural 
Production of Abjections, 10 J. CULT. ECON. 191, 192 (2017). 
29. Id. 
30. See id. (“[S]urveillance is a mode of ‘social sorting’, of categorizing populations according 
to perceived risk or value and treating those respective groups differently.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
31. For example, some “welfare recipients subsist by underreporting income, taking side jobs, 
engaging in barter economies, paying babysitters by letting them use their electronic benefit transfer 
(EBT) food-stamp cards, and so on . . . as ways for individuals to contest the stigmatized 
subjectivities that the state and others force upon them.” Id. at 193. 
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A. Undocumented Immigrants 
Undocumented immigrants in the United States live at privacy’s extremes.32 
Approximately eleven million undocumented immigrants live in the United States, 
making up about four percent of the U.S. population.33 Over sixty-two percent 
have lived in the United States for ten years or more.34 Over 400,000 people per 
year are held in immigration detention in over 250 facilities while they await 
deportation or while their removal proceedings are pending.35 Detainees are 
treated like inmates whether they are housed in a prison alongside people 
convicted of crimes or in a separate detention center.36 Residents of detention 
centers are thus subject to extreme surveillance. 
At the other end of the privacy extreme are the millions of undocumented 
individuals who live their lives in the shadows, fearful of any action or personal 
contact with a government agent that could result in deportation. Immigration 
enforcement was strengthened during the 1980s War on Drugs and further 
bolstered following the terrorist attacks of 9/11.37 During his time in office, 
President Barack Obama deported between two to three million people, more than 
his predecessors combined, although the level of deportations under his watch 
 
32. By “undocumented immigrant” we mean a person who lacks authorization under the United 
States’ immigration laws to be in the United States. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the 
Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 68–69 (2009). The term was first used 
in the Supreme Court by Justice Sotomayor in Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 588 U.S. 100, 103 
(2009). See Christina M. Rodriguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons From 
the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 499, 504 (2014). 
33. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable for Half a 
Decade, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09 
/21/unauthorized-immigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/5QYU-NX8G]; 
Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the 
U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-
facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/6NK9-USQG]. 
34. ROBERT WARREN & DONALD KERWIN, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUDIES, MASS DEPORTATIONS 
WOULD IMPOVERISH US FAMILIES AND CREATE IMMENSE SOCIAL COSTS (Aug. 2017), http: 
//cmsny.org/publications/mass-deportations-impoverish-us-families-create-immense-costs/ [https: 
//perma.cc/JVE8-UJ8V]. 
35. Detention centers are a mix of state and local jails, federal facilities, and for-profit facilities. 
See Maria Mendoza, A System in Need of Repair: The Inhumane Treatment of Detainees in the U.S. 
Immigration Detention System, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L. 405, 426 (2016). 
36. “Both are secure environments in which guards monitor each resident’s movements. Meals, 
personal and legal visits, access to medical providers, and every other aspect of social life are 
regulated.” César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA 
L. REV. 1346, 1383–84 (2014); see also id. at 1390. Despite the similarities to criminal 
imprisonment, detainees actually have fewer rights than criminal defendants. Id. at 1393–97. No 
judge individually assesses the validity of their detention or their suitability for release—even though 
the vast majority have deep roots in the United States and thus pose little public safety or flight risk. 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 
1449, 1457 (2015) (noting that eighty-nine percent of undocumented detainees “have never been 
convicted of a violent offense”). 
37. On the history of immigration policing, see Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. 
L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2014); on the history of immigration detention, see García Hernández, 
Immigration Detention as Punishment, supra note 36, at 1360–82. 
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dropped after 2012 due to shifting immigration enforcement priorities.38 His 
administration focused on deporting people with criminal convictions and created 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a program that offered deferred 
deportations and work permits to as many as 2.1 million children brought into the 
country as minors.39 President Donald Trump’s administration is pursuing more 
aggressive deportation policies,40 including expanding the list of individuals 
subject to deportation;41 hiring additional enforcement agents to identify and 
deport undocumented immigrants;42 building a 2000-mile wall on the United 
States-Mexico border;43 expediting deportation proceedings;44 and ending the 
temporary protected status of approximately 200,000 Salvadorans who have 
resided in the United States for twenty years.45 These aggressive immigration 
enforcement policies have significantly impacted undocumented immigrants and 
their surveillance avoidance. 
Undocumented immigrants populate the surveillance gap despite, and in part 
because of, sophisticated efforts to track them. The government deploys a 
technologically-driven system of surveillance designed to identify, find, and 
apprehend undocumented people. Government databases, which include 
 
38. See Jennifer M. Chacon, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 247–
49 (2017). 
39. Id. at 251–52. 
40. Id. at 254. 
41. Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, WHITE 
HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united [https: 
//perma.cc/BS3U-F84L]. 
42. Id. at Sec. 7. 
43. Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, WHITE 
HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office 
/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements [https: 
//perma.cc/H4DK-6GL5]. 
44. Currently, undocumented immigrants with no connection to any criminal conduct—other 
than being in the country illegally—are being deported in expedited proceedings. See Abigail 
Hauslohner & Sandhya Somashekhar, Immigration Authorities Arrested 680 People in Raids Last 
Week, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/immigration-
authorities-arrested-680-people-in-raids-last-week/2017/02/13/3659da74-f232-11e6-8d72-263470b 
f0401_story.html [https://perma.cc/D7G4-43PM] (“[A] DHS official confirmed that the term 
‘criminal aliens’ includes anyone who had entered the United States illegally or overstayed or 
violated the terms of a visa. There are an estimated 11 million people in the United States who fit 
that profile.”); Lisa Rein, Abigail Hauslohner & Sandya Somashekhar, Federal Agents Conduct 
Immigration Enforcement Raids in at Least Six States, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2017), https: 
//www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-agents-conduct-sweeping-immigration-enforcement-
raids-in-at-least-6-states/2017/02/10/4b9f443a-efc8-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html [https: 
//perma.cc/8D6M-YMMW]. 
45. See Nick Miroff & David Nakamura, 200,000 Salvadorans May Be Forced to Leave the 
U.S. as Trump Ends Immigration Protection, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2018), https: 
//www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-provisional-
residency-for-200000-salvadorans/2018/01/08/badfde90-f481-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/J789-PSR] (discussing how Salvadorans were permitted to live and 
work in the United States following devastating earthquakes in El Salvador). 
GILMANGREEN_PUBLISHERPROOF_3.28.18 .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/18 9:18 PM 
2018] THE SURVEILLANCE GAP 263 
biometric information such as fingerprints and DNA evidence,46 are shared and 
aggregated with private databases that store reams of personal information, 
resulting in combined profiles used to enforce immigration laws and regulate 
access to social services, education, health care, driver’s licenses, employment, 
housing, and transportation.47 Anil Kalhan has labeled this system the 
“immigration surveillance state.”48 One of its goals is to identify people who 
should be deported; another is to make the level of monitoring so extreme that 
individuals self-deport. Another result, and just as common even if not explicitly 
intended, is to force these people to flee into the surveillance gap.49 
The consequences of hiding from the immigration surveillance state are 
concrete and harmful. Undocumented immigrants work, but typically off the 
books, in low-wage, dangerous jobs, where they suffer from wage theft and 
uncompensated workplace injuries.50 They fear contact with government officials, 
which means they are unlikely to enforce their legal rights in court, seek health 
care, or use banks or other financial institutions.51 Reporting suggests that Trump 
administration policies are greatly exacerbating the problem.52 Undocumented 
 
46. DORIS MEISSNER, DONALD KERWIN, MUZAFFAR CHISHTI & CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION 
POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE 
MACHINERY 5 (2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-
states-rise-formidable-machinery [https://perma.cc/9584-M4GM] (explaining that “US-VISIT, with 
its IDENT database, stores more than 148 million fingerprint files that grow by about 10 million 
annually” and that it is the “largest law enforcement biometric database in the world,” accessible by 
both immigration and law enforcement officials). 
47. For example, these integrated systems are used by local police to screen arrestees for 
deportability, by employers to determine whether a potential hire is authorized to work, and by social 
service agencies to determine Medicaid eligibility. See Kalhan, supra note 37, at 27–34. 
48. Id. at 27. According to Kalhan, the immigration surveillance state consists of: 
a kind of immigration panopticism, which eliminates zones in society where 
immigration status is invisible and irrelevant and puts this large array of public 
and private actors in the position of identifying individuals and determining 
immigration status; collecting, analyzing, and storing personal information; 
screening and identifying potential immigration law violators; and sharing 
information with federal immigration authorities. 
Id. at 61. 
49. Id. 
50. See infra Part II.B. 
51. Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: What We Can Learn from the Banking 
and Credit Habits of Undocumented Immigrants, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989, 1000 (describing a 
fear of using the legal system), 1001 (describing fraud by lenders), 1009 (describing predatory 
lending), 1012 (describing under-service of undocumented immigrants by traditional banks) (2015); 
Carola Suárez-Orozco, Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Robert Teranishi & Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco, 
Growing Up in the Shadows: The Developmental Implications of Unauthorized Status, 81 HARV. 
ED. REV. 438, 447 (2011) (“Fear and vigilance shape life in the labyrinth of liminality.”). 
52. See Caitlin Dewey, Immigrants Are Going Hungry so Trump Won’t Deport Them, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/16/immigrants-
are-now-canceling-their-food-stamps-for-fear-that-trump-will-deport-them [https://perma.cc 
/56WX-97HF] (describing undocumented immigrants’ fear of going to the grocery store). 
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immigrants have high rates of crime victimization, but fear reporting to police.53 
They fall prey to fraud and extortion schemes.54 They exhibit high rates of stress, 
anxiety, and hopelessness.55 Today, widespread fear is resulting in undocumented 
people taking extreme measures to avoid immigration authorities, such as pulling 
their children out of school and staying locked in their homes56—and even 
cancelling annual cultural celebrations.57 
Extensive research has recorded the impacts on the 5.5 million children living 
in undocumented households: “the effects . . . are uniformly negative, with 
millions of U.S. children and youth at risk of lower educational performance, 
economic stagnation, blocked mobility, and ambiguous belonging.”58 The 1.1 
million undocumented children in the United States can suffer health deficits, 
because parents are scared to take them to doctors, and educational delays, because 
parents are scared of enrolling them in school.59 Likewise, the 4.5 million U.S.-
citizen children of undocumented parents suffer from constant fear of family 
separation.60 Even though these children are entitled to government benefits such 
 
53. Michelle Mark, Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Appears to Be Having an “Alarming” 
Effect on Public Safety, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/trumps-
immigration-ice-order-crackdown-news-alarming-effect-public-safety-2017-3 [https://perma.cc 
/FX6P-NAPL]. 
54. Nereida Moreno, Scam Artists Target Immigrant Communities, Promising Legal Status for 
Cash, CHI. TRIB. (May 30, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/immigration/ct-
immigration-notary-fraud-met-20170529-story.html [https://perma.cc/HN3X-XQPE]; Kelly Weill, 
Fake ICE Agent Told Immigrants: Pay Me or Get Deported, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 8, 2017), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/fake-ice-agent-told-immigrants-pay-me-or-get-deported [https: 
//perma.cc/N22Z-Z8LZ]. 
55. James S. Gordon, Living in Fear of Deportation Is Terrible for Your Health, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/10/living-in-fear-as-
a-refugee-in-the-u-s-is-terrible-for-your-health [https://perma.cc/A3TB-EGEP]. 
56. Delphine Schrank, Trump’s Season of Fear: Inside the Devastation Left by Immigration 
Raids, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/13 
/undocumented-immigration-raids-ice-impact [https://perma.cc/G7LR-PGT2]; Katherine Q. Seeley 
& Jess Bidgood, ‘Don’t Open the Door’: How Fear of an Immigration Raid Gripped a City, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/immigration-raid-fear-brockton-
massachusetts.html [https://perma.cc/8MEK-F49T]. 
57. Christina Silva, Trump’s Immigration Plan Prompts Immigrants to Cancel Cinco de Mayo 
Celebration in Philadelphia, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trumps-
immigration-plan-prompts-immigrants-cancel-cinco-de-mayo-570952 [https://perma.cc/6CA9-
WGMG]. 
58. Suárez-Orozco, Yoshikawa, Teranishi & Suárez-Orozco, supra note 51, at 461. 
59. See id. at 447 (education); Jan Hoffman, Sick and Afraid, Some Immigrants Forgo Medical 
Care, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/health/undocumented-
immigrants-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/CQ97-UCU3] (health care). 
60. Suárez-Orozco, Yoshikawa, Teranishi & Suárez-Orozco, supra note 51, at 443, 449; Luis 
H. Zayas, Sergio Aguilar-Gaxiola, Hyunwoo Yoon & Guillermina Natera Rey, The Distress of 
Citizen-Children with Detained and Deported Parents, 24 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 3213, 3213 
(2015). 
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as childcare subsidies, preschool programs, and food stamps, their parents are 
often too terrified to apply for benefits on their behalf.61 
In the criminal justice context, Sarah Brayne has identified that law 
enforcement surveillance systems result in “system avoidance,” or deliberate 
efforts by individuals to avoid institutions that gather and keep formal records.62 
Brayne explains that involvement with law enforcement—“from police contact to 
incarceration”63—makes individuals wary of interacting with “hospitals, banks, 
employment, and schools,”64 likely due to a fear of re-exposure to the criminal 
justice system.65 As described above, undocumented immigrants also undertake 
such system-avoidance steps.66 
Whether they are in detention or attempting to avoid it, undocumented 
immigrants live at privacy’s extremes. The United States’ extensive immigration 
surveillance system is a creature of law and a tool of control. It seeks to demarcate 
the worthy citizen from the unworthy usurper, to create a visible structure that 
signifies immigrant fault for societal problems, and to make life in the United 
States so untenable that unauthorized immigrants give up trying to come to this 
country. 
B. Day Laborers 
The modern workplace is a site of extreme surveillance. Employers routinely 
require personality and drug tests before hiring and throughout employment; they 
observe workers through video cameras, monitor keystrokes, listen to telephone 
calls, review emails and Internet usage, deploy mystery shoppers, and track 
 
61. Zayas, Aguilar-Gaxiola, Yoon & Natera Rey, supra note 60, at 3214; see also Suárez-
Orozco, Yoshikawa, Teranishi & Suárez-Orozco, supra note 51, at 447 (describing how parents must 
discuss with their children plans for their care in the event of a parent’s deportation as “a unique 
parental ethnic-racial socialization to the realities of a shadowed existence”); Annie Lowrey, 
Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Policies Are Scaring Eligible Families Away from the Safety Net, ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/trump-safety-net-latino-
families/520779/ [https://perma.cc/5WKR-T4B9] (noting that just living under the cloud of 
deportability puts children in a “constant sense of vulnerability” that creates anxiety and stress levels 
that “lead to aberrant development trajectories in otherwise healthy children”). 
62. Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and 
Institutional Attachment, 79(3) AM. SOC. ASS’N 367, 368 (2014). 
63. Id. at 368. 
64. Id. at 385–86. These effects start early—for young people, “paternalistic contact with the 
state may lead people to avoid institutions that promote prosocial adult activity.” Id. at 386. All these 
impacts fall most heavily on disadvantaged and minority populations that face the most extensive 
surveillance. 
65. Brayne, supra note 62, at 372, 385. 
66. See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text. Given the overlap between the criminal 
justice and immigration systems in terms of information sharing and incarceration—a phenomenon 
known as crimmigration, see Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Policing Sex, Policing Immigrants: What 
Crimmigration’s Past Can Tell Us About Its Present and Its Future, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 149, 151–
52 (2016)—it is not surprising that system avoidance is creating a surveillance gap for many 
undocumented immigrants. 
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movements through GPS or radio frequency devices.67 The realities of rampant 
workplace surveillance are only one extreme; thousands of workers operate 
beyond the reach of these surveillance regimes and find themselves in the 
surveillance gap. 
One group of such workers is day laborers. On any given day in the United 
States, approximately 117,600 people68 seek work as day laborers in jobs such as 
construction, landscaping, roofing, and painting, as well as in restaurants and nail 
salons.69 Employers typically hire day laborers on a day-to-day basis at a public 
site (such as a gas station, street corner, or home improvement store parking lot), 
where as many as two hundred workers may gather.70 The employer and worker 
negotiate a verbal, short-term employment agreement.71 Day-labor markets are 
usually unregulated, and workers are paid in cash;72 this is “temporary work in 
which the work, and often the workers, lack documentation.”73 Earnings are 
variable, but the median wage for day laborers is $10 per hour,74 meaning that 
most day laborers remain below the poverty level, as their annual earnings rarely 
exceed $15,000.75 The market for day labor is driven by employer demands for 
 
67. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 
CALIF. L. REV. 735, 743–44 (2017); Kristie Ball, Workplace Surveillance: An Overview, 51 LAB. 
HIST. 87, 89–90 (2010). These tools are particularly concentrated in the low-wage workforce. See 
Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1400–02. Overall, the purposes of workplace surveillance are to 
maximize worker productivity, protect proprietary information, reduce theft, and increase employee 
welfare and safety. Id. at 1408; Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra, at 739. Yet these systems also 
have economic and social costs. Studies find that employees suffer physical and mental effects from 
surveillance, as well as safety hazards. See id. at 744. Additional impacts on the bottom line can 
result from low morale, diminished trust, and high turnover. See id. at 745. 
68. ABEL VALENZUELA JR., NIK THEODORE, EDWIN MELÉNDEZ & ANA LUZ GONZALEZ, ON THE 
CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2006), http://portlandvoz.org/wp-
content/uploads/images/2009/04/national-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU37-EJMX]. 
69. Id. at 9; Rebecca Smith, Legal Protection and Advocacy for Contingent or “Casual” 
Workers in the United States: A Case Study in Day Labor, 88 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 197, 203–04 
(2008); Nicole Taykhman, Defying Silence: Immigrant Women Workers, Wage Theft, and Anti-
Retaliation Policy in the States, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 96, 114 (2016) (discussing tactics used 
by nail salons, restaurants, and construction companies to avoid paying after an adverse wage theft 
case judgment). 
70. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 1. 
71. Id.; Smith, supra note 69, at 203; Lee, supra note 1, at 661; IMMIGRANTS’ 
RIGHTS/INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, DAY 
LABORERS, WAGE THEFT, AND WORKPLACE JUSTICE IN NEW JERSEY 1 (2011), 
https://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/CSJ/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile
&PageID=177699 [https://perma.cc/HSD4-F6GK] [hereinafter SETON HALL CLINIC]. 
72. SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 1. 
73. Lee, supra note 1, at 559–660. Seventy-five percent of the day-labor workforce is 
undocumented. See Nalini Junko Negi, Battling Discrimination and Social Isolation: Psychological 
Distress Among Latino Day Laborers, 51 AM. J. COMM. PSYCHOL. 164, 164 (2013); see also Smith, 
supra note 71, at 204. 
74. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 10–11. 
75. Smith, supra note 69, at 204; SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 7 (finding in a study 
of New Jersey laborers weekly income ranging from $200 to $400 and an ability to find work for 
one to three days per week). 
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worker flexibility, a downtick in industrial and manufacturing jobs, and the 
number of migrant workers willing to accept payment below market and legally 
mandated rates.76 
Numerous studies highlight the vulnerabilities of day laborers. Many day 
laborers report being victims of wage theft, or the failure to be paid what a worker 
is owed under law.77 Day laborers also toil in dangerous workplaces and suffer 
high rates of injury. A national study of day laborers found that one in five suffered 
a work-related injury and that half of those injured did not receive medical care.78 
Another study found that employers abuse day laborers by denying them adequate 
breaks for food, water, or rest (44%), abandoning workers at the work site (27%), 
insulting and threatening workers (28%), and even acting violently toward 
workers (18%).79 These day laborers face extreme social isolation, as their 
families are often left behind in their home countries, and, while in the United 
States, these workers avoid mainstream social venues.80 In sum, “[i]ts social 
 
76. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 1–2; Janice Fine, 
Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 417, 429–
30 (2005–2006); Edwin J. Meléndez, M. Anne Visser, Nik Theodore & Abel Valenzuela, Jr., Worker 
Centers and Day Laborers’ Wages, 95 SOC. SCI. Q. 835, 835 (2014). 
77. Negi, supra note 73, at 164. A study of New Jersey’s day laborers found that fifty-four 
percent of day laborers statewide were paid less than they were promised by at least one employer. 
See SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 7. A 2006 national study showed that “[n]early half of all 
day laborers (49 percent) have been completely denied payment by an employer for work they 
completed in the two months prior to being surveyed. Similarly, 48 percent have been underpaid by 
employers during the same time period.” VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra 
note 68, at 15. In light of the pervasiveness of this practice, it should come as no surprise that wage 
theft takes many forms: 
paying below the legal minimum; not paying for time worked by having workers 
work “off the clock” before checking in, after clocking out, or by requiring work 
during unpaid break time; not paying for overtime work at the statutory overtime 
rate; for tipped employees, expropriating tips that should be the employee’s; or 
just not paying at all. 
Matthew W. Finkin, From Weight Checking to Wage Checking: Arming Workers to Combat Wage 
Theft, 90 IND. L.J. 851, 851 (2015). 
78. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 12–14; Smith, supra 
note 71, at 204; Negi, supra note 73, at 164. The Seton Hall study found that twenty-six percent of 
day laborers were injured severely enough that they could not work. SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 
71, at 8. Two-thirds of injured workers lose work time due to injury, while others continue to work 
despite injuries due to their dire need for income. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & 
GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 12. Injuries are caused by hazardous conditions such as chemical 
exposures; faulty equipment such as poor scaffold construction; lack of protective gear; and lack of 
safety training. Id. 
79. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 15. 
80. Negi, supra note 73, at 171. Studies of Latina immigrants reveal similar findings of 
loneliness, isolation, and lack of social support. See Alejandra Hurtado-de-Mendoza, Felisa A. 
Gonzalez, Adriana Serrano & Stacey Kaltman, Social Isolation and Perceived Barriers to 
Establishing Social Networks Among Latina Immigrants, 53 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 73, 78 
(2014). 
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status, physical danger, and uncertainty set day labor apart from other forms of 
work.”81 
All of these abuses are against the law; the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA)82 sets forth specific pay, overtime, and recordkeeping requirements and 
covers citizens and non-citizens alike.83 Indeed, courts have held that questions 
about citizenship status are impermissible in FLSA lawsuits.84 Yet the law offers 
little recourse for day laborers. To begin with, because the majority of day laborers 
are undocumented, they live in fear that employers will retaliate against them by 
calling immigration authorities if they complain or make demands.85 
Day laborers who are willing to pursue their statutory rights face additional 
challenges. Government enforcement agencies are notoriously reluctant, 
understaffed, and ineffective in policing day labor violations.86 This is 
compounded by language barriers and lack of information about legal rights.87 
Private lawsuits are hard to bring because the low dollar value of a claim deters 
private attorneys from taking on these claims.88 Even for pro bono and public 
interest attorneys, lawsuits can be challenging because the employers frequently 
exist off the books, with no legal status, identifiable address, or entity to sue.89 
Collecting judgments is often fruitless as many employers develop “tactics to 
successfully avoid paying judgments even after losing the case,” such as declaring 
bankruptcy, selling their property, and creating bogus shell companies to hide 
 
81. Lee, supra note 1, at 660; see also Jayesh M. Rathod, Danger and Dignity: Immigrant Day 
Laborers and Occupational Risk, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 813, 831–32, 849–52 (2016). 
82. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. (2014). 
83. See Smith, supra note 71, at 205; see also Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 
933 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[E]mployers who unlawfully hire unauthorized aliens must otherwise comply 
with federal employment laws.”). 
84. Jennifer J. Lee, Outsiders Looking In: Advancing the Immigrant Worker Movement 
Through Strategic Mainstreaming, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 1063, 1075 (2014) (citing cases). 
85. Id.; SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 1. 
86. Smith, supra note 71, at 201; Lee, supra note 1, at 662; SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 
71, at 10; Finkin, supra note 77, at 855 (“This system has not proven equal to the task.”).  
87. Lee, supra note 1, at 662; SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 1. 
88. Lee, supra note 1, at 662. The Seton Hall Clinic study found that only 2.6% of workers 
filed complaints with the state labor agency; 3.4% filed in small claims court; and 26% reported that 
employers threatened to report them to immigration authorities. SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, 
at 9. 
89. Rebecca J. Livengood, Organizing for Structural Change: The Potential and Promise of 
Worker Centers, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 346–47 (2013) (“Employers who flout wage and 
hour regulations may also violate other laws regarding business corporations, and these violations 
may make employers more difficult to sue and to bind via judgment.”). 
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assets.90 There is often no paper trail, such as pay stubs,91 time sheets, or tax 
reporting forms,92 linking these workers to their employers. 
In addition, employers commonly misclassify day laborers as independent 
contractors, removing them from the purview of legal protections for wages and 
against discrimination, as well as workplace benefits such as workers 
compensation, unemployment insurance, and social security disability.93 In turn, 
workers lack the legal knowledge or resources to challenge those 
misclassifications.94 Many day laborers are hired by fly-by-night subcontractors, 
allowing companies at the top of the contracting chain to wash their hands of 
liability.95 Making matters worse, many employers deem the costs of complying 
with compensation laws in the short term to be greater than the long-term costs of 
violating said laws, leading them to shirk their legal obligations.96 
Simultaneously, some jurisdictions have enacted anti-solicitation statutes to 
crack down on day-labor sites due to perceived threats to community safety and 
potential economic injuries to local businesses.97 These laws push day laborers 
further into the surveillance gap. Moreover, when day laborers organize to claim 
and demand their rights—essential forms of resistance to the surveillance gap98—
they face increased pushback through employer lawsuits99 and politically 
motivated restrictions on organizing.100 Thus, day laborers find themselves in a 
 
90. Taykhman, supra note 69, at 114. 
91. See, e.g., Arturo Gonzalez, Day Labor in the Golden State, CAL. ECON. POL’Y, July 2007, 
at 5, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/cep/EP_707AGEP.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF5H-DMYM]. 
“In most cases, employers and workers publicly negotiate terms of employment, including the type 
and length of task to be performed and the payment, typically in cash, for the work provided.” Id. at 
2. One of this article’s co-authors, Michele Gilman, directs a law clinic that handles wage and hour 
claims. In the clinic’s experience working with day laborers, it is often impossible to obtain 
documentation of hours worked or pay earned, because employers pay in cash and/or fail to create 
such records. 
92. Lee, supra note 1, at 660. 
93. See Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of Wage 
Litigation and Its Impact on Low Wage Workers, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355, 362 (2013); 
David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four Billion Dollar 
Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 140–41, 144–45 (2015). 
94. See Raja Raghunath, A Founding Failure of Enforcement: Freedmen, Day Laborers, and 
the Perils of an Ineffectual State, 18 CUNY L. REV. 47, 60–63 (2014). 
95. See Ruan, supra note 93, at 359. 
96. See Finkin, supra note 77, at 855. 
97. Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 1617, 1627–28 (2011); Negi, supra note 73, at 164; Smith, supra note 71, at 210 (noting 
that some of these statutes have been overturned as free speech violations). 
98. See infra Part IV. 
99. Nicole Hallett, From the Picket Line to the Courtroom: A Labor Organizing Privilege to 
Protect Workers, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 475, 478–79 (2015) (describing employer 
litigation tactics to squelch day-labor organizing). 
100. See Cummings, supra note 97, at 1620 (discussing anti-solicitation ordinances designed 
to push day laborers out of certain areas); Ben Penn & Tyrone Richardson, Labor Department 
Looking into Worker Center Scrutiny: Acosta, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www.bna.com/labor-department-looking-n73014472124/ [https://perma.cc/BUT5-XSHY] 
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constant push-and-pull between remaining in the surveillance gap and surfacing 
to assert their rights, facing the associated risks of doing so. 
C. Homeless People 
Homeless people live in a polarized state of privacy—on the one hand, they 
live their lives in public; on the other hand, they are pushed to the margins of 
public spaces and often treated as invisible by passers-by. According to a 2015 
study by the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, “at least 2.5 to 3.5 
million Americans sleep in shelters, transitional housing, and public places [and] 
an additional 7.4 million have lost their own homes and are doubled-up with others 
due to economic necessity.”101 One-third of homeless people live outside, 
exposing their belongings and personal lives to the public;102 about two-thirds of 
homeless persons reside in some form of shelter or transitional housing.103 These 
shelter settings are privacy-stripping by their very nature, due to a status quo 
defined by overcrowding and pervasive surveillance systems.104 Regardless of 
whether they have found shelter or live their lives out in the open, homeless 
individuals find that their destitution is often on display.105 Yet, paradoxically, 
homeless people simultaneously inhabit a state of invisibility, a form of extreme 
privacy brought about by societal norms and laws that push people without homes 
to society’s margins. As Don Mitchell and Nik Heynan describe, “[l]aws (or 
increased policing) that make sleeping more difficult and dangerous, panhandling 
riskier, and tending to bodily needs all but impossible, push the homeless as well 
as the housed poor more deeply into the urban shadows.”106 
Surveillance of homeless people comes in many forms: homeless people 
hoping to secure a place in a shelter must answer personal intake questions and 
submit to background checks as the price of admission. To remain in the shelter, 
 
(discussing the Trump administration’s attempts to define worker centers as unions in order to 
subject them to financial disclosure rules). 
101. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: OVERVIEW 
OF DATA AND CAUSES (Jan. 2015), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Homeless_Stats_Fact_Sheet 
[https://perma.cc/T8JE-UHT7]. 
102. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., THE 2016 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT 
REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 8 (2016), https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents 
/2016-AHAR-Part-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3A3-Z7S7] [hereinafter AHAR]. 
103. Id. 
104. See infra notes 140–141 and accompanying text. 
105. “[T]he hallmark of homelessness is a lack of private seclusion, so people experiencing 
homelessness endure conditions of persistent, nearly inescapable visibility.” Sara K. Rankin, The 
Influence of Exile, 76 MD. L. REV. 4, 6 (2016). Homelessness is associated with vice, laziness, and 
pathology. See id. at 7, 14; Tony Sparks, Broke Not Broken: Rights, Privacy, and Homelessness in 
Seattle, 31 URB. GEOGRAPHY 842, 843 (2010). 
106. Don Mitchell & Nik Heynan, The Geography of Survival and the Right to the City: 
Speculations on Surveillance, Legal Innovation, and the Criminalization of Intervention, 30 URB. 
GEOGRAPHY 611, 613 (2009). 
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they must acquiesce to extensive and prolonged surveillance.107 Further, to access 
certain social services, homeless people must provide answers to highly personal 
questions, including information about HIV/AIDS status, mental health and 
substance abuse history, and their experience with domestic violence.108 Their 
responses are funneled into the nationwide Homeless Management Information 
System (HMIS), a database designed to assess and measure needs and to 
coordinate a response through homeless services.109 In addition, and specifically 
for homeless families, the school systems’ residency verification requirements can 
worsen housing instability. For example, if, as a result of a school inquiry, a 
landlord learns that unauthorized occupants are living in a unit, she might evict 
the occupants—people who likely have no other place to go.110 
The law has limited capacity to protect homeless individuals from these 
privacy intrusions, largely because the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable government searches and seizures generally does not apply to people 
and personal items in public spaces.111 Yet the activities of homeless people are, 
by necessity, “conducted in public; [homeless people] typically make their ‘home’ 
on property that they are not entitled to be on; their belongings and activities are 
on ‘open fields’ which common passersby can easily see; and they are almost 
perpetually voluntarily exposing themselves to the public.”112 United States v. 
Jones,113 which held that it is an unconstitutional physical trespass for police to 
 
107. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 856 (describing a state of “heightened surveillance and 
nearly constant hypervisibility”). 
108. J.C. O’Brien, Loose Standards, Tight Lips: Why Easy Access to Client Data Can 
Undermine Homeless Management Information Systems, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673, 688 (2007). 
109. See HMIS Data and Technical Standards, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/hmis/hmis-data-and-technical-standards/ [https: 
//perma.cc/L56W-ZFA8] (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). 
110. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMELESS STUDENTS COUNT: HOW 
STATES AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS CAN COMPLY WITH THE NEW MCKINNEY-VENTO EDUCATION LAW 
POST-ESSA 8 (2016), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Homeless-Students-Count [https: 
//perma.cc/PN22-CYRC] (“[School systems] must use due care to ensure that residency verification 
policies, McKinney-Vento eligibility determinations, and other procedures designed to prevent fraud 
accommodate the unique needs of homeless students and/or their families, and do no erect barriers 
to their identification or immediate enrollment.”). 
111. On personal property, see generally Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth 
Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946 (2016). Brady discusses 
cases involving property of homeless persons, concluding that homeless persons fare poorly before 
courts that focus only on the location of privacy, but do better before courts that look at the overall 
context of the item and the expectations of its owner. 
112. Kami Chavis Simmons, Future of the Fourth Amendment: The Problem with Privacy, 
Poverty and Policing, 14 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 240, 250 (2014); see also 
Lindsay J. Gus, The Forgotten Residents: Defining the Fourth Amendment “House” to the Detriment 
of the Homeless, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 769 (2016); Elizabeth Schutz, The Fourth Amendment Rights 
of the Homeless, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003 (1992); Justin Stec, Why the Homeless Are Denied 
Personhood Under the Law: Toward Contextualizing the Reasonableness Standard in Search and 
Seizure Jurisprudence, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 321 (2006); David H. Steinberg, Constructing 
Homes for the Homeless? Searching for a Fourth Amendment Standard, 41 DUKE L.J. 1508 (1992). 
113. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
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put a GPS on a person’s car, has spurred hope that the Supreme Court might 
expand notions of privacy outside the home.114 Yet Kami Chavis Simmons argues 
that this is unlikely to help the poor, because it does not reach “the face-to-face 
law enforcement interactions that many residents of poor, urban neighborhoods 
face on a daily basis.”115 For these reasons, it is widely recognized that homeless 
people lack the legal or spatial privacy granted to people who can afford homes. 
By contrast, it is less recognized how homelessness can result in too much 
privacy—or a surveillance gap. 
Homeless people inhabit the surveillance gap for several reasons. To begin 
with, homeless people who live outside (roughly one-third of the homeless 
population) face a barrage of laws designed to push them out of sight.116 Across 
the country, cities have enacted laws that essentially criminalize homelessness—
these laws prohibit camping in public; sleeping in public; sleeping in vehicles; 
sitting or lying down in public; panhandling; loitering, loafing, and vagrancy; 
living in vehicles; bathing in public fountains; urinating or defecating in public; 
using shopping carts in public parks; storing personal property on public property; 
and sharing food in public.117 At the same time, local law enforcement agents 
issue “move-on” orders and trespass warnings to homeless people and engage in 
sweeps of homeless camps, removing homeless people from public space and 
destroying their belongings.118 Ironically, surveillance technologies deployed by 
law enforcement, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras positioned 
around cities, operate to push homeless people into the surveillance gap.119 
Together, these statutes and enforcement strategies disperse the homeless to 
secluded places, where the cycle of “banishment” and “eviction” begins again.120 
As a result, homeless persons dedicate “more resources of time, energy, and 
money into not appearing homeless, or disappearing into darker and more 
dangerous recesses of the urban fabric.”121 Criminalization policies that make it 
harder for people to exit homelessness—such as expensive fines and the collateral 
 
114. See Simmons, supra note 112, at 240. 
115. Id. at 255. 
116. See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 10–12, 22–28 (2016), 
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Housing-Not-Handcuffs [https://perma.cc/S2HQ-UEPD] 
[hereinafter HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS]; Jordan Bailey, Food-Sharing Restrictions: A New Method 
of Criminalizing Homelessness in American Cities, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 273, 277–80 
(2016). On food sharing restrictions, see also Mitchell & Heynan, supra note 106, at 623–24. 
117. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 116, at 22–28. 
118. Id. at 12, 30–31; see also Mitchell & Heynan, supra note 106, at 617. 
119. See Mitchell & Heynan, supra note 106, at 618–19. CCTV cameras are also positioned 
above dumpsters in order to discourage dumpster diving and to prevent homeless people from 
sleeping in them. Id. at 618. 
120. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 116, at 12, 30. 
121. See Sig Langegger & Stephen Koester, INVISIBLE HOMELESSNESS: ANONYMITY, 
EXPOSURE AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 26, http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges 
/CLAS/Departments/PoliticalScience/Research/Documents/Homelessness%20Research/Invisible%
20Homelessness_Langegger_Koester.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DFT-GQKY]. 
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consequences of convictions—create barriers to employment and secure housing, 
which in turn perpetuate residence in the surveillance gap.122 
Lawsuits challenging municipal restrictions against homeless people have 
had mixed results.123 Most successful have been challenges to food-sharing laws 
in which the plaintiffs are not homeless people, but rather charities claiming 
violations of their associational and free-exercise-of-religion rights.124 The 
number of laws that force homeless people into the surveillance gap has increased 
across the board, in some cases dramatically, over the last decade.125 During this 
time, courts have found ways to distinguish groundbreaking cases such as 
Pottinger v. City of Miami,126 which held that it is unconstitutional to arrest 
homeless individuals for engaging in “life sustaining conduct” such as sleeping, 
sitting, or standing in certain public places.127 Finally, even when a court strikes 
down an anti-homeless ordinance, the remedy awarded tends to fall short of 
addressing the underlying structural problem: a lack of available housing.128 
Unaccompanied homeless children represent a particularly distressing 
subsection of the surveillance gap population.129 An estimated 1.7 million 
 
122. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 116, at 13. 
123. See Marc L. Roark, Homelessness at the Cathedral, 80 MO. L. REV. 53, 126–27 (2015) 
(describing legal successes and subsequent development of doctrine); see also Rankin, supra note 
105, at 31–36 (discussing First Amendment challenges to anti-begging ordinances), 48–50 
(discussing Eighth Amendment challenges to criminalization of homelessness laws). 
124. See Bailey, supra note 116, at 289–90. In particular, cities have had better success in 
defending food-sharing laws that restrict, rather than forbid, food sharing. Id. at 290 (“A City 
determined to keep charities from feeding individuals experiencing homelessness will always be 
able to find permitted alternatives if a preferred method is defeated in litigation.”). 
125. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 116, at 10–11. For instance, camping bans have 
increased by 69%; sleeping in public bans have increased by 31%; bans on sitting or lying down in 
public have increased by 52%; bans on loitering, loafing, and vagrancy have increased by 88%; bans 
on living in vehicles have increased by 143%; and panhandling bans have increased by 43%. 
126. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
127. The arrests violated the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments, the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition on warrantless searches and seizures, the Due Process Clause, and 
the right to travel. Id. at 1565–77. However, the original Pottinger holding was narrowed 
considerably in subsequent years. For an overview of litigation results, see Donald Saelinger, 
Nowhere to Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances Criminalizing Homelessness, 13 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 545, 555–57 (2006). 
128. See Eric S. Tars, Heather Maria Johnson, Tristia Bauman & Maria Foscarinis, Can I Get 
Some Remedy?: Criminalization of Homelessness and the Obligation to Provide an Effective 
Remedy, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 738, 743 (2014) (discussing the Pottinger case and noting, 
despite a favorable holding in the lower court, a failure to ultimately secure adequate housing as a 
part of a later settlement). 
129. See Lynn M. Harter, Charlene Berquist, B. Scott Titsworth, David Novak & Tod Brokaw, 
The Structuring of Invisibility Among the Hidden Homeless: The Politics of Space, Stigma, and 
Identity Constructions, 33 J. APPLIED COMM. RES. 305, 306 (2005). A point-in-time survey identified 
36,097 unaccompanied homeless children and youth. This number is likely to be an undercount. See 
NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 1, 30 (2016), 
https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-
homelessness-report/ [https://perma.cc/M25M-8B5F]. 
GILMANGREEN_PUBLISHERPROOF_3.28.18 .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/18 9:18 PM 
274 N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 42:253 
children fall into this category per year.130 These children typically fall into 
homelessness due to family strife, financial crises, and housing instability.131 A 
large proportion are LGBTQ132 and are cast out by their families.133 Homeless 
children are acutely aware of the stigma of homelessness, which drives them to 
live their lives underground, to mask their homelessness. As Lynn Harter and her 
colleagues explain, “[t]o make their status visible by seeking help risks public 
stigmatization; to avoid stigmatization requires invisibility.”134 Thus, they 
develop street smarts to survive, which involves “reliance on instincts to read a 
situation, preparedness, adaptability, and in general a heightened level of 
awareness of one’s surroundings.”135 However, these tactics of invisibility can 
consequently limit access to services provided by the government or private 
agencies. Further, the tensions of maintaining invisibility result in some young 
people becoming “aggressive,” which “often put[s] them at risk for arrest and 
incarceration,” while other youths become “withdrawn, listless, or depressed—
characteristics that increase their likelihood of experiencing personal 
victimization.”136 Homeless children are particularly susceptible to physical abuse 
and sexual exploitation, and they may resultantly face mental health challenges, 
develop substance abuse issues, or even die.137 Meanwhile, schools and other 
institutions are unable (or unwilling) to recognize and develop the survival skills 
that homeless children have honed, despite the potential sources of social capital 
or personal transformation these skills represent.138 While the McKinney-Vento 
Homeless Assistance Act requires states and school districts to identify homeless 
children and enroll them in school, the law is inadequately funded, and states 
struggle to comply due to a lack of staffing and technical assistance.139 
 
130. Supporting the Education of Unaccompanied Students Experiencing Homelessness, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR HOMELESS EDUC. 2 (Aug. 2017), https://nche.ed.gov/downloads/briefs/youth.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VSU6-DTW2]. 
131. See Homeless and Runaway Youth, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 
14, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/homeless-and-runaway-youth.aspx [https: 
//perma.cc/7YGT-Y6FQ]. 
132. Id. (between twenty and forty percent).   
133. Alex Morris, The Forsaken: A Rising Number of Homeless Gay Teens Are Being Cast Out 
by Religious Families, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com
/culture/features/the-forsaken-a-rising-number-of-homeless-gay-teens-are-being-cast-out-by-religi
ous-families-20140903 [https://perma.cc/M3RJ-ZXH3]. Shelters offer limited beds for the youth 
population, and children congregate in different areas than homeless adults. See Harter, Berquist, 
Titsworth, Novak & Brokaw, supra note 129, at 312–15. 
134. Harter, Berquist, Titsworth, Novak & Brokaw, supra note 129, at 323. 
135. Id. at 319. 
136. Id. at 318. 
137. See Homeless and Runaway Youth, supra note 131. 
138. Harter, Berquist, Titsworth, Novak & Brokaw, supra note 129, at 321–22. 
139. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY: HOMELESS STUDENTS COUNT: HOW 
STATES AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS CAN COMPLY WITH THE NEW MCKINNEY-VENTO EDUCATION LAW 
POST-ESSA 2 (2016), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Homeless-Students-Count [https: 
//perma.cc/WM4X-AJP3]. 
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The surveillance gap is also reinforced when homeless people refuse social 
services. Shelters can be dehumanizing and dangerous, with a lack of privacy, 
strict conduct rules, and extreme surveillance, leading some homeless persons to 
prefer living outside.140 Some shelters sound more like prisons than social service 
providers; for example, one such shelter is “operated by the county’s sheriff’s 
department with the help of private security guards, [where] rule breakers are 
required to sleep outside in an exposed courtyard, even when it rains.”141 This 
lack of privacy may be why some people who find themselves impoverished resist 
the shelter systems and, therefore, circumvent additional public aid that may 
otherwise enable them and their children to break the cycle of poverty. 
In addition, homeless people may not seek out shelters because they do not 
want to provide the personal information that HMIS systems require.142 Notably, 
information provided to HMIS can be released to law enforcement on a mere oral 
request for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect or material witness.143 
As one commentator has noted, “[t]he ease of accessibility to client [data] through 
oral requests threatens to compound the already challenging task of eliciting 
complete and accurate information from homeless clients,”144 who are, by virtue 
of their homelessness, often living in violation of laws that regulate their public 
conduct. Of course, this withdrawal from homeless service systems has a cost, as 
people lose out on public aid and services that may be able to help them survive 
or transition out of homelessness. Still, by opting to remain in the surveillance gap, 
homeless people are pointedly defying surveillance.145 Thus, the story of 
homelessness is “not a one-way story of oppression, restriction, and decline . . . . 
It is also a story of both coping in the shadowed interstices of the city and of 
fighting back.”146 
D. People with Felony Conviction Histories 
A final and much narrower example illustrates the nuanced gradations of the 
surveillance gap: the elusiveness of Virginians with felony conviction histories 
who, despite the Commonwealth’s desire to reinstate their right to vote, cannot be 
located by government officials.147 Virginia’s constitution strips individuals 
 
140. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 849, 856. 
141. Id. 
142. See O’Brien, supra note 108, at 689–90. 
143. Id. at 693. 
144. Id. at 694. 
145. See Geoffrey DeVerteuil, Matthew Marr & David Snow, Any Space Left? Homelessness 
Resistance by Place-Type in Los Angeles County, 30 URB. GEOGRAPHY 633, 635 (2009) (describing 
the act of refusing shelter as a “form of resistance to the infantilizing tendencies of the welfare 
state”). 
146. Mitchell & Heynan, supra note 106, at 613. Homeless resistance to the surveillance gap 
is discussed infra Part IV. 
147. One of the primary motivations for writing this article comes from co-author Rebecca 
Green’s experience working on rights restoration in Virginia. In 2014, Green and her then-student 
Mark Listes co-founded Revive My Vote, a nonpartisan organization that assists Virginians in 
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convicted of a felony of their voting rights permanently,148 but the governor has 
discretion to restore voting rights to individuals.149 Starting with his inauguration 
in 2014, former Governor McAuliffe made restoring voting rights to those with 
felony convictions a centerpiece of his administration.150 In April 2016, 
McAuliffe decided to grant the right to vote to every Virginian who had finished 
her term of incarceration and supervised probation.151 Yet when it came to 
identifying and locating those whose rights were to be restored, the Restoration of 
Rights Office (RoR) within Virginia’s Secretary of the Commonwealth could 
identify only 206,000152 of the estimated 350,000153 people who stood to regain 
the right to vote in Virginia. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court found that 
McAuliffe’s April order violated the Virginia constitution, requiring McAuliffe 
instead to restore rights on a case-by-case basis.154 McAuliffe proceeded to 
comply by affirmatively restoring rights to every eligible person meeting his 
single criterion: completion of her term of incarceration and supervised 
probation.155 While McAuliffe restored rights to more Virginians than any other 
 
regaining the right to vote through a hotline and website. REVIVE MY VOTE, www.revivemyvote.com 
[https://perma.cc/Y4WX-H5GX] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). Through a generous grant from the 
Knight Foundation, Revive My Vote has helped hundreds of Virginians. Governor McAuliffe’s 2016 
reforms make rights restoration easier than it has ever been. That said, Revive My Vote’s hotline has 
received queries from hundreds of Virginians who, for many reasons as discussed here, fall through 
the cracks of Virginia’s records systems. 
148. See VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“No person who has been convicted of a felony shall be 
qualified to vote unless his civil rights have been restored by the Governor or other appropriate 
authority.”). Virginia is one of four states that permanently disenfranchise people convicted of 
felonies. The other three are Florida, Kentucky, and Iowa. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in 
the United States, SENTENCING PROJECT (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org
/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-laws-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/6FU7-
UDPW]. According to the Sentencing Project, 6.1 million United States citizens cannot vote because 
of a felony conviction. Id. 
149. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
150. Press Release by Office of the Governor of Va., Governor McAuliffe Restores More 
Voting Rights than Any Governor in American History (Apr. 27, 2016), https: 
//governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/newsarticle?articleId=20164 [https://perma.cc/J82K-96XS] 
(explaining at an April 2017 rights restoration event in Norfolk that “[e]xpanding democracy in 
Virginia has been my proudest achievement during my time as Governor”). 
151. See Press Release by Office of the Governor of Va., Governor McAuliffe Restores Voting 
and Civil Rights to Over 200,000 Virginians (Apr. 22, 2016), https://governor.virginia.gov 
/newsroom/newsarticle?articleId=15008 [https://perma.cc/6BWQ-9WLZ]. 
152. See Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E. 2d 706, 710 (2016). 
153. See ACLU OF VIRGINIA, supra note 3. Some sources put this figure closer to 450,000. See 
Dara Lind, Map: 5.8 Million Americans Can’t Vote Because of Their Criminal Records, VOX (Oct. 
5, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/10/5/6906875/state-prisoner-voting-law-felon-
disenfranchisement-map-virginia [https://perma.cc/F5U8-VW4X]. 
154. See Howell, 788 S.E. 2d at 722–24. 
155. McAuliffe announced the new standard for rights restoration on August 22, 2016, 
following the Supreme Court of Virginia’s ruling that his April 22, 2016, blanket restoration 
exceeded his authority under Virginia’s constitution. The new standard instructed the Secretary of 
the Commonwealth’s office to identify “individuals who may meet the Governor’s standards for 
restoration: individuals who have been convicted of a felony and are no longer incarcerated or under 
active supervision by the Department of Corrections (DOC) or other state agency.” See Governor 
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governor in the state’s history (173,000 people during his term),156 he had the 
political will to restore many more. What stood in his way, even amid a so-
called “golden age of surveillance,” was his administration’s inability to identify, 
locate, and notify all eligible individuals.157 
It has been difficult for RoR to locate eligible Virginians for several reasons. 
To begin, RoR is dependent on other state agencies to provide data on individuals 
who may be eligible, yet Virginia statutes, like those of other states, prohibit 
information sharing between state agencies except under defined 
circumstances.158 Further, confidentiality restrictions on who may access state 
databases prevent advocacy groups from helping with the work.159 
Accessing Virginia’s court records to confirm eligibility and contact 
information is likewise constrained. Prior to 2016, Virginians hoping to regain the 
right to vote could do so only by submitting an application.160 Since Virginia lacks 
a centralized management system for court records, individuals, advocacy 
organizations, and RoR sought records at individual county courts. Some, but not 
all, counties make records available online, to varying degrees, and information 
about accessing court records is often murky.161 What is more, Virginia court 
 
McAuliffe Policy Memorandum, Governor McAuliffe’s Restoration of Rights Policy (Aug. 22, 
2016), https://commonwealth.virginia.gov/media/6733/restoration-of-rights-policy-memo-
82216.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4CK-72J2]. 
156. See Outgoing Va. Gov. McAuliffe Says Rights Restoration His Proudest Achievement, 
ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 10, 2018, 9:00 PM), https://wtop.com/virginia/2018/01/gov-terry-mcauliffe-
final-state-commonwealth [https://perma.cc/26YZ-U55L]. 
157. Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 416, 420 (2012). 
158. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3806 (requiring that notice be provided to a data subject of “the 
possible dissemination of part or all of this information to another agency, nongovernmental 
organization or system not having regular access authority,” and requiring the agency to “indicate 
the use for which [the data] is intended”); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800; VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
3803 (requiring that agencies holding personal information “[m]ake no dissemination to another 
[data] system without (i) specifying requirements for security and usage including limitations on 
access thereto, and (ii) receiving reasonable assurances that those requirements and limitations will 
be observed”). 
159. Each year, RoR makes public a list of individuals whose rights have been restored (as 
required by Article V Section 12 of Virginia’s constitution). See LIST OF PARDONS, COMMUTATIONS, 
REPRIEVES AND OTHER FORMS OF CLEMENCY, SENATE DOCUMENT NO. 2 (2017), 
https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2017/SD2/PDF [https://perma.cc/E5YJ-P3AN] for a recent 
example listing individuals whose civil rights were restored between January 2016 and January 
2017.  These lists do not contain personal information such as contact information, date of birth, or 
social security numbers. This makes it difficult for advocacy organizations to reach out to individuals 
whose rights have been restored to conduct new and returning voter education efforts. 
160. For a brief period prior to leaving office, Governor Robert F. McDonnell restored rights 
to individuals who had not applied for rights restoration upon receiving lists from Virginia’s 
Department of Corrections of individuals who had completed their terms of incarceration and 
supervised probation. See Governor McDonnell Announces Process for Automatic Restoration of 
Voting and Civil Rights for Non-Violent Felons, ALEXANDRIA NEWS (July 15, 2013), 
https://www.alexandrianews.org/2013/governor-mcdonnell-announces-process-for-automatic-
restoration-of-voting-and-civil-rights-for-non-violent-felons/ [https://perma.cc/87ZA-6GPM]. 
161. See VIRGINIA COURTS CASE INFORMATION WEBPAGE, http://wasdmz2.courts.state.va.us
/CJISWeb/circuit.jsp [https://perma.cc/8DDN-YFA8] (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) (“This is the case 
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clerks are elected, meaning that politics may play a role in how quickly courts 
respond to requests for information on people seeking to restore their civil 
rights.162 Beginning in 2016, McAuliffe no longer required people to produce 
court records in order to regain their right to vote.163 Yet, in the case of federal 
convictions, RoR must verify information with federal law enforcement agencies 
and federal courts, a process that has also proved challenging due to federal court 
clerk concerns about data sharing and privacy.164 
Despite gubernatorial efforts to simplify the rights restoration process, RoR 
and voting rights organizations still exert “a tremendous amount of effort” to 
identify individuals eligible for rights restoration in Virginia.165 Finding contact 
information for individuals recently released from prison and not under supervised 
probation or parole is often a challenge. Those recently released from prison often 
live with friends or families or in transitional housing, and they therefore lack a 
permanent address.166 For those released from the correctional system years or 
 
management system for circuit courts in Virginia. This is a project with a limited number of courts. 
Cases may be searched using name, case number, or hearing date. Searches must be done by 
individual courts. Statewide searches are not possible. Please note: The Circuit Courts of Alexandria 
and Fairfax do not use the statewide Circuit Case Management System, and therefore, cannot 
participate in the Online Case Information System. Please contact these courts directly for case 
information not available through this System.”). 
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-217. Prior to McAuliffe’s removal of the requirement that fines 
and fees be paid as a condition of rights restoration in July 2015, providing proof of payment of fines 
and fees constituted an enormous obstacle to many because of difficulties associated with confirming 
payment at the relevant court. See Travis Fain, McAuliffe Widens Voting Rights Restoration, DAILY 
PRESS (June 23, 2015), http://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-nws-mcauliffe-felon-voting-
20150623-story.html [https://perma.cc/SD3J-UZ2L] (describing how McAuliffe removed the 
requirement that individuals pay court costs prior to applying for rights restoration). The governor’s 
order did not remove the requirement that court fees be paid, it just provided that payment status 
would no longer prevent individuals from applying for rights restoration. 
163. See Governor McAuliffe Policy Memorandum, supra note 155 (noting that the RoR will 
affirmatively restore rights to individuals even when they have not applied for rights restoration). 
164. Citing privacy concerns, federal court clerks hesitate to share conviction data with RoR, 
making it surprisingly difficult for RoR to confirm that Virginians with federal convictions have 
completed their sentences for purposes of restoring their right to vote. Interview by co-author 
Rebecca Green with Kelly Thomasson, Va. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, in Richmond, Va. (Mar. 
10, 2017) (discussing a letter that Thomasson received from a Fourth Circuit clerk). The Virginia 
State Police has access to federal data, but only recently began sharing this information with RoR. 
Federal probation officers and judges have expressed discomfort with sharing information in bulk 
about federal conviction histories, instead requiring RoR to make individual requests. RoR therefore 
sends hundreds of individual letters asking for information to confirm completion of incarceration 
and supervised probation. Federal probation officers have told RoR that they will not disclose names 
of people currently under supervision, citing privacy concerns. Id. 
165. Graham Moomaw, McAuliffe Rights Restoration Official Will Stay on Under Northam, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/governme
nt-politics/mcauliffe-rights-restoration-official-will-stay-on-under-northam/article_bfdc6d2a-525b-
56e5-a2df-02e0083be72e.html [https://perma.cc/3TTG-K8TM]. 
166. See Richard P. Seiter & Karen R. Kadela, Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not, 
and What Is Promising, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 360, 361 (2003) (“Prisoners have historically returned 
to the communities from which they were sentenced, generally to live with family members, attempt 
to find a job, and successfully avoid future criminality.”); Nathan James, Offender Reentry: 
Correctional Statistics, Reintegration into the Community, and Recidivism, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 
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even decades ago, locating accurate address information is similarly daunting, a 
task made more difficult if the individual moves, especially out of state, or changes 
her name. 
Another cognizable hurdle to locating individuals who are eligible for voting 
rights restoration is reticence on the part of people with prior convictions to engage 
with government institutions. Institutional avoidance among people with histories 
of police stops, arrests, convictions, or incarceration is well documented.167 This 
lack of engagement with societal institutions has negative impacts on people’s 
health, employment, financial security, and exposure to crime. The surveillance 
state may even “fuel the very behavior it is trying to suppress,” because people 
who live “off the books” lack the sorts of institutional attachments, such as 
employment, associated with low crime rates.168 Unsurprisingly, this pattern of 
disengagement disproportionately impacts disadvantaged and minority 
populations.169 
Many otherwise-eligible Virginians hesitate to come forward because of a 
perceived stigma related to their convictions. One caller to a radio talk show about 
rights restoration in Virginia who lost his voting rights as a young adult for 
marijuana possession explained that he lies to his kids every year on Election Day 
when they ask whether he voted.170 Many Virginians excluded from the political 
polity are too embarrassed to come forward to regain the right to vote.171 
Additionally, in summer of 2016, frequent changes in policy combined with back-
and-forth litigation left many otherwise-eligible Virginians confused about 
whether their right to vote could be restored.172 
 
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34287.pdf [https:// perma.cc/9HGS-NZKX] (noting 
several factors that make housing difficult for inmates recently released, including “the scarcity of 
affordable and available housing, legal barriers, discrimination against ex-offenders, and strict 
eligibility requirements for federally subsidized housing”). 
167. See generally Brayne, supra note 62. 
168. Id. at 372. 
169. Id. at 369, 385. 
170. Hearsay with Cathy Lewis, WHRO RADIO (June 4, 2013), http://www.hearsay.org 
/post/HearSay-from-the-Headlines-64.aspx [https://perma.cc/9KQC-6KHU] at 16:15 (follow 
“Download Episode” hyperlink). 
171. See, e.g., Sam Levine, Listen to Former Felons Who Can Vote Again Explain the Power 
of the Ballot, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/virginia-
restoration-of-voting-rights_us_5a045ea9e4b03deac08b96f9 [https://perma.cc/2DW9-2QFW] 
(describing one citizen’s embarrassment regarding his right to vote because he felt like an “outcast” 
on Election Day). 
172. Revive My Vote, a project at William & Mary Law School to assist Virginians in 
regaining the right to vote, see REVIVE MY VOTE, supra note 147, receives frequent callers to its 
hotline who assume that the Virginia Supreme Court decision prevents McAuliffe from restoring 
voting rights to otherwise-eligible Virginians. This is crippling misinformation, since there has never 
been a better time for restoring voting rights in Virginia. See Zachary Roth, Murky Picture on Voting 
Rights for Virginia’s Ex-Felons, NBC NEWS (July 26, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com 
/politics/2016-election/murky-picture-voting-rights-virginia-s-ex-felons-n617261 [https://perma.cc 
/8CZY-D6DH] (“Thanks to confusion and uncertainty caused by the back and forth, not to mention 
the lengthy timeline likely required for restoring rights individually, it’s far from clear just how many 
former felons will end up registering to vote by the fall.”). 
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Although McAuliffe was extremely motivated to restore voting rights to as 
many Virginians as he could, and despite the expansiveness of the modern 
surveillance state, the task of locating eligible Virginians was remarkably fraught. 
These residents of the surveillance gap proved very difficult to find. 
E. Conclusion 
As these case studies show, life in the surveillance gap can be miserable and 
dehumanizing. It can harm mental and physical health, reinforce poverty, tear 
apart families, and strip people of dignity. In the surveillance gap, economic 
stability is difficult to maintain, and becoming economically mobile is nearly 
impossible. For citizens within the gap, the ability to effect change through voting 
is often restricted by barriers to voter registration, such as a lack of a permanent 
address (i.e., homeless individuals), voter disenfranchisement, or system 
avoidance. Government and private actors increasingly gather, aggregate, and 
analyze data to tackle social issues and apportion resources in health care, 
education, financial services, and more. People in the surveillance gap are 
excluded from these data streams due to a lack of access to technology,173 fear of 
creating an electronic trail,174 or failure to be captured within mainstream data 
collection mechanisms.175 As a result, their experiences and needs are left out of 
policy discussions and responses.176 Laws perpetuate the surveillance gap—a 
largely lawless zone. Moreover, elites obtain political benefits from the 
surveillance gap and maintaining its boundaries. The myth about the surveillance 
 
173. See Andrew Perrin, Smartphones Help Blacks, Hispanics Bridge Some—but Not All—
Digital Gaps with Whites, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/08/31/smartphones-help-blacks-hispanics-bridge-some-but-not-all-digital-gaps-with-
whites/ [https://perma.cc/3CV9-QRUG]; Andrew Perrin, Digital Gap Between Rural and Nonrural 
America Persists, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 19, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/05/19/digital-gap-between-rural-and-nonrural-america-persists/ [https://perma.cc/6T4Z-
5XUB]; Access & Use of Technology: Factors Affecting Access and Use of Information Technology, 
USC PRICE TOMÁS RIVERA POL’Y INST. (June 19, 2015), http://immigrantservices 
.uscmediacurator.com/key-barriers-to-access-and-use-of-technology-2/ [https://perma.cc/H6KF-
P5ZK]. 
174. See Mary Ann Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 453 (2017); 
Joel Rose, Federal Plan to Keep Files of Immigrant Social Media Activity Causes Alarm, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/30/554557044/federal-plan-to-keep-
files-of-immigrant-social-media-activity-causes-alarm [https://perma.cc/8J9P-9KXE]. 
175. Mimi Onuoha, On Missing Data Sets (Aug. 15, 2016), https://github.com 
/MimiOnuoha/missing-datasets [https://perma.cc/PTD9-9EBL]. Onuoha lists four reasons why 
datasets that should exist might not: 
1. Those who have the resources to collect data lack the incentive to. 2. The data 
to be collected resist simple quantification (corollary: we prioritize collecting 
things that fit our modes of collection). 3. The act of collection involves more 
work than the benefit the presence of the data is perceived to give. 4. There are 
advantages to nonexistence. 
Id. 
176. Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 58–60 (2013) 
(describing economic and political harms of big data exclusion). 
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gap is that its inhabitants are responsible for their plight and affirmatively choose 
to remain invisible. By upholding this myth, society evades the collective costs of 
reforming structural systems that cause and perpetuate the surveillance gap. 
III. 
FRAMING THE SURVEILLANCE GAP 
The discussion below examines the surveillance gap through five analytical 
lenses. First, we look to the growing recognition in privacy theory of differentiated 
privacy harms—the idea that different groups experience privacy harms in 
different ways. Second, we examine how feminist legal theory teaches us about 
the problem of viewing privacy harms through a strictly public-versus-private 
lens. Third, we review the consumer and criminal privacy scholarship that attaches 
agency to individuals through choice and consent defaults. Fourth, we explore 
fundamental rights theories of privacy, examining how countries that have 
formalized this theory into their bodies of laws effectively closed the surveillance 
gap altogether. Finally, we analyze how and whether Helen Nissenbaum’s theory 
of contextual integrity can inform our understanding of the harms suffered in the 
surveillance gap. 
A. Differentiated Privacy 
In 1890, the grandfathers of American privacy law, Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis, criticized the growing phenomenon of yellow journalism, chronicling 
the lifestyles of the rich and famous, in their seminal article, The Right to Privacy. 
Warren and Brandeis wrote: 
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread 
broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the 
indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can 
only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The 
intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, 
and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more 
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become 
more essential to the individual.177 
For Warren and Brandeis, the objects under the microscope were their elite 
peers; the voyeuristic masses ogled elites distastefully through the expanding dual 
scourges of instantaneous photography and penny journalism.178 American 
privacy law was therefore born not of respect for every American’s right of 
 
177. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 
(1890). 
178. Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 
1304 (2010) (contending that Warren and Brandeis wanted to protect elites from the glare of privacy 
invasions by social inferiors). 
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privacy, but rather of a push for rarified privacy, freeing elites from the gaze of 
the uncivilized.179 Warren and Brandeis’s assertions in some way mark the 
beginning of marginalized groups’ exclusion from the privacy narrative.180 
In his 1967 book Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin—another significant 
privacy scholar—took a more democratized approach to privacy, arguing that 
privacy of the common man manifested a core pillar of democratic society.181 
Westin painstakingly documented the many ways in which the lack of privacy 
marked the totalitarian state.182 The expansion of privacy enabled the democratic 
citizen to form her thoughts and engage in democratic betterment.183 Though 
Westin democratized privacy, he did not address marginalized groups or examine 
the nuanced problem that too much privacy poses.184 For Westin, privacy was a 
good that every democratic citizen ought to seek and enjoy.185 
Since Westin, scholars have fostered a narrative of privacy’s gradual demise. 
In light of an increasingly powerful and omnipresent administrative surveillance 
state and increasingly sophisticated private-sector efforts to track consumers on- 
and offline, scholars began to examine the impact of privacy laws and norms on 
different groups—what we call here “differentiated privacy.”186 Others began to 
ask whether and under what circumstances too much privacy is a problem.187 
More recently, new strains of scholarship have begun to examine more nuanced 
impacts of differentiated privacy. Scholarship examining discriminatory 
surveillance is one example. 
 
179. See Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1424–27. For an additional critique of Warren and 
Brandeis as elitist, see ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY 
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 125, 135–36 (2000). 
180. See Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1394. “The right to be left alone was conceived to 
protect society’s elites (such as Warren and Brandeis) from the glare of public scrutiny.” Id. at 1426. 
181. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 24 (1967) (“Just as social balance favoring 
disclosure and surveillance over privacy is a functional necessity for totalitarian systems, so a 
balance that ensures strong citadels of individual and group privacy and limits both disclosure and 
surveillance is a prerequisite for liberal democratic societies.”). 
182. See id. at 651–58. 
183. See id. at 51 (1967) (“[P]rivacy is a necessary element for the protection of organizational 
autonomy, gathering of information and advice, preparation of positions, internal decisionmaking, 
inter-organizational negotiations, and timing of disclosure. Privacy is thus not a luxury . . . ; it is a 
vital lubricant of the organizational system in free societies.”). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. See, e.g., Helaine F. Lobman, Spousal Notification: An Unconstitutional Limitation on a 
Woman’s Right to Privacy in the Abortion Decision, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 12, 531–60 (1984) 
(women); Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 8 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER J. 181, 215 (1991) (poor people); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: 
RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 22–55 (1997) (Black women). This term 
should not be confused with “differential privacy,” which refers to a process of systematically adding 
“random numbers generated from a special distribution centered at zero to the results of all data 
queries” for the purposes of protecting the privacy interests of individuals whose data is contained 
in datasets. See Jane Bambauer, Krishnamurty Muralidhar & Rathindra Sarathy, Fool’s Gold: An 
Illustrated Critique of Differential Privacy, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 701, 703 (2014). 
187. Feminist legal theory narratives discussed below provide examples. See infra Part III.B. 
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Discriminatory surveillance can be understood as surveillance of, or privacy 
intrusions on, certain groups as opposed to others. John Gilliom’s work on the 
welfare system’s hyper-surveillance of women receiving government benefits in 
rural Appalachia is illustrative.188 Other scholars follow this line of thought, 
wondering to what extent the dominant privacy narrative left out the stories of 
marginalized groups.189 They have explored what marginalized people have long 
known: that marginalized people tend to have less privacy in their homes, bodies, 
and decisions than their more privileged counterparts.190 As far back as the United 
States’ founding, “overseers of the poor” chased indigent people out of colonial 
towns or auctioned them off for labor.191 In the 1800s, “when poorhouses became 
the dominant poor relief policy, the poor were warehoused in dismal quarters 
where they labored under the watchful eye of the ‘keeper.’”192 Near the turn of 
the twentieth century, poverty policy became more benevolent;193 nevertheless, 
the Scientific Charity Movement “relied on ‘friendly visitors’ to investigate the 
homes of the poor and exhort them to higher morals.”194 When the New Deal 
created the modern welfare state, surveillance of the “undeserving poor”—able-
bodied adults seen as capable of doing work—continued.195 For instance, in 
administering welfare, “states devised a variety of surveillance tactics—such as 
midnight raids on welfare recipients’ homes and moral fitness tests.”196 These 
tactics aimed to “reduce the welfare rolls and push poor women, mostly of color, 
into the low-wage labor force.”197 Welfare surveillance continues today, in the 
 
188. GILLIOM, supra note 4. 
189. See, e.g., Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1389; BRIDGES, supra note 4, at 5–6; Franks, 
supra note 174, at 427–28; VIRGINIA EUBANKS, DIGITAL DEAD END 25–34 (2011). 
190. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 58; see also GILLIOM, supra 
note 4, at 19. 
191. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 58; see also WALTER I. 
TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 9 (6th 
ed. 1999). 
192. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; see also TRATTNER, supra 
note 178, at 57–61; MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
WELFARE IN AMERICA 27–28 (10th ed. 1996). 
193. See Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 583–84 (2001). 
194. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; see also KATZ, supra note 
192, at 70 (discussing the role of “charity organization society agents and visitors”); TRATTNER, 
supra note 191, at 91–92 (discussing the proliferation of charitable organizations during this time 
and their practices). 
195. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59. On the New Deal division 
between deserving and undeserving poor, see Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare 
Queen, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 257–58 (2014), and sources cited therein. 
196. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, 
CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 21 (2011) 
(describing the “man in the house” rule, according to which unmarried women who were found 
sleeping with men were deemed morally unfit and cut off from assistance). 
197. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; see also GUSTAFSON, supra 
note 196, at 21 (“The unstated but underlying goals of the rules were to police and punish the 
sexuality of single mothers, to close off the indirect access to government support of able-bodied 
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form of drug tests, DNA tests, fingerprinting, extreme verification requirements, 
and various forms of intrusive questioning.198 In short, scholars have documented 
the ways in which many marginalized persons have far less privacy than other 
Americans. Yet this narrative is incomplete; some marginalized persons have too 
much privacy. 
Dean Spade explains the mechanisms by which the administrative state 
categorizes people, resultantly replicating power imbalances and further harming 
marginalized groups.199 Social welfare programs “are designed in ways that 
reflect and amplify contemporary understandings of who is ‘inside’ and who is 
‘outside’ of the group whose protection and cultivation is being sought, which 
means they always include determinations of who deserves protection and who is 
a threat.”200 The groups of people described in this article’s case studies are all 
persons considered, in one way or another, to be a threat—either for their 
criminality, their impact on labor competition, or their failure to succeed in a 
 
men, to winnow the welfare rolls, and to reinforce the idea that families receiving aid were entitled 
to no more than near-desperate living standards.”). 
198. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; see also Gustafson, supra 
note 4, at 312–21 (discussing drug testing of welfare recipients); BRIDGES, supra note 4, at 111–12 
(discussing intrusive questions asked of Medicaid recipients); Class Differential, supra note 4, at 
1397–1400 (discussing privacy intrusions that welfare recipients face, including paternity testing 
and fingerprinting). The current welfare system focuses on putting poor people to work, but the low-
wage workforce—where one-third of workers are employed—is rife with sophisticated surveillance 
tactics: 
Employers today log computer key strokes, listen to telephone calls, review 
emails and Internet usage, conduct drug tests, employ mystery shoppers, watch 
closed-circuit television, and require psychometric and “honesty” tests as 
conditions of employment. Employers increasingly track employee movements 
through GPS or radio frequency devices, which “create new streams of data 
about where employees are during the workday, what they are doing, how long 
their tasks take, and whether they comply with employment rules.” 
Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 60 (quoting Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the 
Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 
93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 112 (2014)); see generally Kirstie Ball, Workplace Surveillance: An Overview, 
51 LAB. HIST. 87 (2010); ALEX ROSENBLAT, TAMARA KNEESE & DANAH BOYD, DATA & SOC’Y 
RESEARCH INST., WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536605 [https://perma.cc/6Z9E-6RBR]; Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, 
supra note 67 (discussing workplace surveillance). 
199. DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND 
THE LIMITS OF LAW 73–93 (Rev. ed. 2015). Spade writes in the context of critical trans theory. 
Administrative sorting by gender is problematic because trans people can be difficult to classify, 
misclassified, or forced into categories that do not match their lived existence. Id. at 77. As a result, 
the state denies many trans people basic life necessities, such as health care, and exposes them to 
violence, such as through incarceration in sex-segregated facilities. Id. at 81–82. The War on Terror 
in particular has heightened the costs of “inconsistencies in identifying information.” Id. at 16. 
200. Id. at 75. Scholarship on surveillance and social sorting makes a similar point. See, e.g., 
Magdalena König, The Borders, They Are A-Changin’! The Emergence of Socio-Digital Borders in 
the EU, 5 INTERNET POL’Y REV. (Mar. 31, 2016), https://policyreview.info/node/403/pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L2TW-JNSD] (“[M]odern surveillance becomes increasingly influential in 
determining societal power relations.”). 
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capitalist system. Thus, they fall outside the line of societal protections, resources, 
and support.201 
Surveillance scholars are also beginning to unpack what can be termed big-
data discrimination.202 What happens when the harnessed forces of big data meant 
to address societal problems have negative impacts on certain groups? One early 
observer of this phenomenon, Kate Crawford, pointed to the problem of benefits 
flowing principally to the affluent and Internet-connected: 
Big data can provide valuable insights . . . but it can only take us 
so far. Because not all data is created or even collected equally, 
there are “signal problems” in big-data sets—dark zones or 
shadows where some citizens and communities are overlooked or 
underrepresented. . . . [B]ig-data approaches to city planning 
depend heavily on city officials understanding both the data and 
its limits.203 
Crawford cites Boston’s “Street Bump” app as an example. As the civic data 
movement took off, the City of Boston joined in, enabling city dwellers to 
transform their phones into mobile pothole detectors using a simple app. The app 
transmitted data directly to city government, which used the data to determine 
which areas of the city most needed street repair. Although an ingenious bit of 
civic imagination, the project had its weaknesses: most notably, residents of the 
more affluent portions of the city were more likely to install the app, thus distorting 
the true picture of need and exacerbating already-enormous disparities in Boston 
street maintenance.204 
Daniel Castro similarly urges attention to this “data divide,” pointing out that 
“individuals who come from data-rich environments may find that they have a 
 
201. See SPADE, supra note 199, at 75 (“Norms regarding race, gender, sexuality, national 
origin, ability, and indigeneity always condition and determine who falls on either side of [the] 
line.”). 
202. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (discussing big-data discrimination in employment and lack of adequate 
legal remedies); Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735 (2015) (discussing 
impacts of administrative database screening and digital watchlisting programs); Pauline T. Kim, 
Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860 (2017) (discussing big-
data discrimination in employment); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, GA. 
L. REV. 38 (forthcoming 2017) (discussing big-data discrimination in policing); Craig Konnoth, 
Health Information Equity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1317 (2017) (discussing big-data discrimination in 
health care). On the risk of exclusion, see Lerman, supra note 176, at 55. 
203. Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data: Why the Rise of Machines Isn’t All It’s Cracked 
Up to Be, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013) http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/10/think-again-big-
data/ [https://perma.cc/X64D-HLWJ]. 
204. Id. Other scholars have picked up on Crawford’s concern. See, e.g., Barocas & 
Selbst, supra note 202, at 685 (“[Errors of exclusion] may befall historically disadvantaged groups 
at higher rates because they are less involved in the formal economy and its data-generating 
activities, have unequal access to and relatively less fluency in the technology necessary to engage 
online, or are less profitable customers or important constituents and therefore less interesting as 
targets of observation.”); Lerman, supra note 176, at 55 (discussing the “threats big data poses to 
those whom it overlooks”). 
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comparative advantage over those who grow up in data poverty,” and suggesting 
that these “advantages may translate into better health care outcomes, increased 
access to financial services, enhanced educational opportunities, and even more 
civic participation.”205 This growing divide may lead to “data deserts,” or “areas 
of the country characterized by a lack of access to high-quality data that may be 
used to generate social and economic benefits.”206 Harms that result from data 
deserts and discriminatory algorithms are drawing increasing scholarly 
attention.207 The case studies in this article show that the deserts already exist. 
These examples provide illustrations of potentially discriminatory impacts of 
the civic data movement, data deserts, and distortion. Low-income people in 
particular risk either exclusion from opportunities such as access to credit or 
exposure to discrimination in the form of predatory lending based on data-driven 
algorithms, collaterally and adversely impacting areas such as employment, 
education, and policing.208 Yet current law, devised long before the rise of the 
Internet, provides scant protection against data discrimination.209 
Since Warren and Brandeis, privacy scholarship has reckoned with 
differentiated privacy. Increasingly, modern privacy scholarship focuses on the 
problem of discriminatory surveillance, data collection, and data use. The 
surveillance gap adds an additional harm: discrimination that arises from the lack 
of data inputs from marginalized groups. The next section traces seeds of this idea 
in feminist legal theory. 
B. Feminist Legal Theory and the Public/Private Binary 
The bulk of privacy scholarship focuses on defining the benefits of privacy, 
tracking privacy’s demise, and suggesting remedies to restore it. In these 
discussions, privacy generally has positive connotations; it is variously associated 
with “freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control 
over information about oneself, freedom for surveillance, protection of one’s 
reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations.”210 By contrast, 
 
205. Castro, supra note 5, at 2. 
206. Id. 
207. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015) (describing privacy 
implications of corporate data collection and analysis); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The 
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing 
how scoring industries collect data and apply algorithms to rank consumers without oversight of 
how the ranking is done or protections against discriminatory scoring outcomes); Anupam 
Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (2017) (discussing discriminatory effects 
of corporate consumer data use); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (describing data discrimination). 
208. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 56–57. Increasingly, big data 
profiles are being built not only from information gathered about individuals, but also from social 
networks inputs, subjecting people to inferences drawn from the behavior of their online “friends.” 
Id. at 56. 
209. See generally id. at 79–112. 
210. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2002). 
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feminist theorists have long recognized that privacy can be a double-edged sword; 
their insights are thus helpful for examining surveillance gaps. 
Second-wave feminists identified and deconstructed the public/private divide 
in society and law that historically served to oppress women.211 Traditionally, the 
public domain was dominated by men to the exclusion of women, namely in work 
and politics.212 “By contrast, the private domain was that of home and family, 
where autonomous individuals lived free from state interference.”213 
Nevertheless, feminists observed that domestic autonomy only truly extended to 
men, because women and children depended on them for material goods.214 This 
dominance emboldened men to abuse women in the home, their abuse exacerbated 
by a parallel failure of the state to intervene.215 Elizabeth Schneider called this 
dynamic “the violence of privacy.”216 Recognizing that facially harmless 
government inaction can ultimately be as detrimental as overtly destructive 
government action, feminists “rejected the view that the government’s hands-off 
approach was formally neutral, because the state set the legal ground rules that 
permitted private inequality to flourish unchecked.”217 
Moreover, feminists argued that the ideal of autonomy was a myth for 
women, who are typically enmeshed in family relationships of dependency, care-
giving, and attachment.218 Catherine MacKinnon posited that privacy can never 
be a basis for claiming rights, because it is a tool of gender subordination that 
leaves men alone (that is, out of the public eye) and thus free to oppress women.219 
The feminist critique of the public/private divide led to legal and political demands 
 
211. See Martha A. Ackelsberg & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Privacy, Publicity, and Power: A 
Feminist Rethinking of the Public-Private Distinction, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL, FEMINIST 
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY 213, 217–20 (1996). 
Parts of this summary of feminist legal theory were previously recounted in Michele Estrin Gilman, 
Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L. FORUM 1, 14–23 (2008) [hereinafter Welfare, 
Privacy]. 
212. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14; see also Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing 
Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 568 (2006) (summarizing the public/private dichotomy). 
213. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14; Kim, supra note 212, at 568–69. 
214. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14; see also Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the 
Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 850–51 (2000). 
215. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14; see also Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: 
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, 
JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 128–29 (1989); NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 180 (2006). 
216. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 983 (1991). 
217. Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14–15; see also Frances Olson, The Family and the 
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1510 (1983); OKIN, supra 
note 215, at 111. 
218. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988); Robin 
West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal 
Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 84 (1987). 
219. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 194 (1989). 
Further, MacKinnon argued that privacy obscures women’s lack of choice and consent within the 
private realm, and, by isolating women, it obscures “women’s shared experience.” Id. 
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and had powerful repercussions. For instance, the state today criminalizes 
domestic violence, provides legal recourse for women demanding equal treatment 
in the workplace, and recognizes a right to abortion, which enforces decisional 
privacy.220 
This second-wave feminist theory of privacy, however, faced at least three 
major critiques. First, because it is based on the experiences of white, middle-class 
women, it ignored differences of class and race, particularly the experiences of 
poor, African-American women, who have historically lacked privacy in their 
bodies and homes.221 The state appropriated Black women’s bodies during 
slavery222 and subsequently coerced poor Black women into sterilization, 
disproportionately removed Black children from their homes through the child 
welfare system, and subjected Black women to searches and ongoing surveillance 
as a condition of receiving welfare.223 Thus, for poor, minority women, privacy 
in the home could offer a refuge from the oppression and racism of the outside 
world.224 At the same time, Black women were never excluded from the 
workforce; after slavery, they often worked outside the home, usually in domestic 
roles or backbreaking manual labor.225 
Second, the feminist critique downplayed certain positive liberal values 
associated with privacy. Liberal feminists such as Anita Allen and Linda McClain 
have championed privacy, unwilling to “toss out the baby . . . with the bath 
water.”226 They acknowledge the harms done to women under cover of 
“privacy,”227 but contend that a reconceived notion of the public/private divide 
can be valuable for women as both a descriptive tool and normative goal. Privacy 
 
220. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 4–5 (2000). 
At the same time, engagement with the state to combat domestic violence has costs; the state often 
reflects and enforces patriarchal norms, and state enforcement limits women’s autonomy. Id. at 181–
98 (describing tensions inherent in the criminalization of domestic violence). 
221. See Jennifer C. Nash, From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist 
Legal Theory, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 303, 319 (2005) (“[B]ecause the black female body is 
inscribed and engraved with particular gendered and racialized cultural meanings, the black female 
subject has never been granted the same kind of privacy as the white female, the privacy that some 
feminists have argued needs to be ‘exploded.’”); see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: 
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 61 (1988) [hereinafter UNEASY ACCESS] (“It is plain that in 
the United States domestic privacy is a virtual commodity purchased by the middle class and the 
well-to-do.”). 
222. Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 770 (1999); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts 
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 
1437–40 (1991). 
223. See id. at 1440–44. 
224. Id. at 1470–71. PRISCILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 237 (2005). 
225. JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE 
FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 1–7 (2010). “[B]lack married women have always worked 
in proportionately greater numbers than white wives[.]” Id. at 2. 
226. UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 221, at 71; see also McClain, supra note 222, at 765. 
227. See UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 221, at 70; McClain, supra note 222, at 776. 
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is essential to moral personhood and self-development;228 it provides women with 
a respite from lives devoted to domestic labor.229 Following liberal tradition, these 
feminists argue that women “should be permitted to live out their disparate, 
nonconforming preferences” and that privacy promotes this goal by giving women 
the space to develop and carry out their own ends.230 
Third, a new generation of feminists has jettisoned certain forms of privacy. 
This movement, called “third-wave feminism,” is generally associated with a first-
person, “narrative approach; [an] emphasis on sexual empowerment and 
liberation; [an] anti-essentialist perspective” that recognizes the diversity of 
women’s lives; and an “embrace of technology” as an organizing and confessional 
“tool.”231 Third-wave feminism is less overtly political than its forbears and 
focuses more on “personal evolution” than “collective revolution.”232 For these 
feminists, “throwing off the mantle of privacy is a freely directed choice by a 
liberated woman, or at least a positive step toward claiming autonomy” on her 
own terms.233 Female autonomy, however, faces an inevitable backlash. Women 
engaging in the public, online sphere have faced onslaughts of revenge porn and 
cyber-harassment.234 In turn, Allen has queried whether we need to “coerce 
privacy”235 in order to “undergird the liberal vision of moral freedom and 
independence [that] is generally consistent with both liberalism and with the 
egalitarian aspirations of feminism.”236 
Feminist theory provides a helpful frame for considering the surveillance gap. 
It recognizes that privacy, at either of its extremes, can be devastating to people’s 
autonomy, dignity, and day-to-day subsistence.237 It shows how law demarcates 
both public and private spheres and can be a tool for both oppression and 
 
228. See UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 221, at 36. 
229. McClain, supra note 222, at 783. 
230. UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 221, at 76. 
231. Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 20. 
232. Id. at 20–21. 
233. Id. at 22. 
234. See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378–84 (2009); Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, 
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 350–54 (2014); Lori Janjigian, Nearly 
10 Million Americans Are Victims of Revenge Porn, Study Finds, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/revenge-porn-study-nearly-10-million-americans-are-victims-
2016-12 [https://perma.cc/U9PC-89ZZ] (“[W]omen under 30, minorities, and members of the 
LGBTQ community are much more likely to be threatened with revenge porn than men.”). 
235. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 740 (1999) (“To speak 
of ‘coercing’ privacy is to call attention to privacy as a foundation, a precondition of a liberal 
egalitarian society. Privacy is not an optional good . . . .”). 
236. Id. at 729. 
237. Compare Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 113, 122 (2011) (describing the “devastating absence of privacy” for indigent pregnant 
women that “distinguishes their experiences with the state from [those of] their monied 
counterparts”) with Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L. QUART. 475, 475 
(1999) (“Feminists have attempted to pierce this shield of [family] privacy, to reach the injustice of 
family relationships and the law that permits them.”). 
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liberation. Just as law creates surveillance regimes, it also can create and reinforce 
surveillance gaps—by pushing certain groups into system avoidance or by 
privileging powerful interests over vulnerable groups. People in the surveillance 
gap—undocumented immigrants, homeless people, people with felony conviction 
histories, and day laborers—tend to have too much or too little privacy. Yet 
feminist theory recognizes what people in the surveillance gap know from 
experience: that privacy is inherently neither desirable nor distasteful. Rather, it is 
a deeply contextualized condition, its value varying based on the differences in 
people’s lives. 
A key strand of feminist theory focuses on intersectionality, i.e., recognition 
that people embody multiple identities and can consequently suffer multiple 
oppressions on the basis of self-identity. Intersectionality is a “method for 
interrogating the institutional reproduction of inequality, whether at the level of 
the state, the family, or of legal structures more generally.”238 Kimberle Crenshaw 
identified how people experience different, interlinked systems of oppression and 
how law often fails to recognize those intersections. For instance, in employment 
discrimination, Crenshaw explained that Black women sometimes “experience 
discrimination as Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination.”239 
Because discrimination law recognizes harms only on the basis of the mutually 
exclusive categories of race and sex, these Black women have difficulty stating a 
cognizable legal claim.240 Similarly, people in the surveillance gap suffer from 
interlocking forms of oppression and discrimination. For instance, day laborers 
fall into the surveillance gap due to a combination of national origin, gender, class, 
skill level, age, language, and non-citizen status. They are subject to structural 
constraints emanating from the “operation of global capital, through international 
relations, monetary policies, domestic social policies, the employment 
relationship [and] the family.”241 This combination of identities and structural 
inequalities results in extreme isolation and pushes legal relief out of reach for day 
laborers, as law protects some of their individual attributes, but ignores or punishes 
others. Indeed, the state of being surveilled or overlooked is itself an intersectional 
factor, but one that is rarely recognized. As Mary Ann Franks writes, 
“[m]arginalized populations, especially those who experience discrimination at 
the intersection of multiple forms of subordination, also often find themselves at 
the intersection of multiple forms of surveillance: high-tech and low-tech, virtual 
and physical.”242 Or, they might find themselves pushed into the surveillance gap. 
 
238. EMILY GRABHAM, DAVINA COOPER, JANE KRISHNADAS & DIDI HERMAN, Introduction, in 
INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND: LAW, POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION 1 (2008). 
239. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1 U. CHI. L.F. 139, 
149 (1989). 
240. Id. at 141–43, 148–49. 
241. GRABHAM, COOPER, KRISHNADAS & HERMAN, supra note 238, at 3. 
242. Franks, supra note 174, at 464. 
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C. Choice, Consent, and Resistance Within the Surveillance Gap 
Most privacy discussions today explore how to preserve and maintain privacy 
boundaries when much of our personal information has been collected and stored 
by government and private industry. Although Americans routinely tell pollsters 
that they value privacy,243 most appear willing to sacrifice some degree of privacy 
to gain other benefits such as the convenience of online shopping, the sense of 
security when travelling through an airport, or the ability to chat with a wide 
network of friends on social media. The truth is that people do not want privacy 
absolutely; rather, they want to choose when to give it up and when to retain it.244 
Given these attitudes, along with our political history, it is not surprising that our 
privacy-law regime is based on a liberal conception of the individual as an 
autonomous person who freely strikes bargains for her benefit.245 This framework 
is ill-fitting not only for preserving privacy, but also for bridging the surveillance 
gap. 
Currently, privacy law in the United States is “fragmented” and “sectoral.”246 
Unlike most other developed nations, the United States does not have a single data 
protection law.247 Instead, it has industry-specific statutory protections, such as 
laws that govern the collection and use of data by health or financial services 
industries.248 Outside of these narrow statutes, the United States relies for its 
privacy regime primarily on the same approach that it has used since the 1970s—
self-regulation by the entities that gather and maintain personal data along with 
responsibility on individuals to police their own data disclosures.249 This approach 
 
243. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1880, 1886 (2013) [hereinafter Privacy Self-Management]. 
244. Christine Jolls, Privacy and Consent over Time: The Role of Agreement in Fourth 
Amendment Analysis, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1693, 1693–94 (2013) (“Privacy, far from referring 
to a sphere within which one is always ‘let alone,’ refers to a sphere in which we are allowed to 
determine who may enter, when, and under what circumstances.”). 
245. However, social science studies have shown this model to be imperfect, demonstrating 
that individuals make choices based on false assumptions and that context, as opposed to autonomy, 
shapes our privacy preferences. See Privacy Self-Management, supra note 243, at 1887. 
246. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014). 
247. Although this article focuses on federal law due to its national scope, state laws also 
govern privacy, surveillance, and data collection. Partly due to congressional intransience, some 
state legislators and attorneys general have been particularly energetic in protecting and enforcing 
privacy interests, particularly in the consumer context. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy 
Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 750 (2016); Ganka 
Hadjipetrova & Hannah G. Poteat, States Are Coming to the Fore of Privacy in the Digital Era, 6 
LANDSLIDE 12 (2014); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 917–18 
(2009). For a list of relevant laws, see State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATORS (June 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/LLT3-A9LF]. 
248. See generally BJ Ard, The Limits of Industry-Specific Privacy Law, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 607, 
607 (2015) (describing why “the distinct features of online commerce . . . challenge discrete industry-
specific laws”). 
249. See Privacy Self-Management, supra note 243, at 1880. 
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is referred to as “notice and choice.”250 The linchpin of this privacy self-
management is the assumption that people consent to the use of their personal data 
when they access a website and agree, either implicitly or explicitly, to the terms 
of service. Advocates of the notice-and-choice approach contend that it respects 
individual autonomy, encourages technological innovation, and helps businesses 
provide information to consumers and target people with beneficial offers.251 By 
contrast, critics charge that notice and choice is a fiction since people do not 
understand what privacy interests they forfeit when they log on to various websites 
or make consumer choices, given that privacy disclosures are lengthy, vague, 
jargon-filled, and time-consuming to read.252 Even a person who reads a particular 
company’s privacy policy would not understand the extent to which “Internet 
giants use data mining to shape and control the environment in which consumers 
use their products and services.”253 Further, simply “too many entities [are] 
collecting and using personal data to make it feasible for people to manage their 
privacy separately with each entity”254 or to foresee how their data might be used 
downstream. In short, consumer consent is a mirage. 
The law regarding government surveillance is also based on a model of 
consent. The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable government 
searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has long held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects only objectively reasonable expectations of privacy. In Katz 
v. United States, the Court ruled that a defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a phone booth.255 Once outside the proverbial phone booth (or if 
citizens choose not to close the phone booth door), citizens lose this protection; 
they have chosen to give up their privacy rights. Thus, the Fourth Amendment 
does not attach to information that people share in public or to third parties,256 
such as “data given to commercial third parties, including banking records, 
telephone call lists, cell phone locations, or Internet search or subscriber 
information.”257 All of this privately gathered data is shared regularly with 
government entities in a “public private surveillance partnership.”258 To keep 
 
250. See Joel R. Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russel, Alexander J. Callen, Sophia Qasir & Thomas 
B. Norton, Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. 
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 486–87 (2015). 
251. See id. at 489–90 (summarizing arguments). 
252. Nancy S. Kim & D.A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-Governmental Actors 
and the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 732–33 (2015); Privacy Self-
Management, supra note 243, at 1884–85. 
253. Kim & Telman, supra note 252, at 729. 
254. Privacy Self-Management, supra note 243, at 1881. 
255. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
256. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes the risk, in 
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government.”). 
257. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 327, 373–75 (2015); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth 
Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 59 (2014). 
258. Kim & Telman, supra note 252, at 763. 
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anything private, one must maintain absolute secrecy, which is increasingly 
impossible.259 Moreover, as everyday expectations of privacy diminish, it is less 
reasonable to expect the government to respect individual privacy. Even where the 
Supreme Court recognizes a reasonable privacy interest, the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirement of a warrant supported by probable cause falls away in the face of 
voluntary consent.260 The Court has found consent even in situations marked by 
extreme police intimidation.261 As one commentator has summarized, “though the 
premise of the consent-search doctrine is that people are free to decline, the reality 
is that nearly everyone ‘consents,’ at least as the Court has defined that term.”262 
The consent calculus falls particularly harshly on marginalized people. The 
Supreme Court has ruled that once a person seeks government assistance, she 
“chooses” to relinquish any claims to privacy.263 For instance, in Wyman v. James, 
the Court upheld the policy of having government workers search the homes of 
welfare recipients to ensure compliance with welfare eligibility requirements.264 
The Court ruled that the visits were not searches covered by the Fourth 
Amendment because “[t]he choice is entirely [the individual’s], and nothing of 
constitutional magnitude is involved.”265 Yet someone whose children are hungry 
and who faces homelessness without government assistance “consents” only 
under conditions of duress.266 By contrast, more affluent citizens are not asked to 
consent to searches of their private homes in exchange for the valuable 
government benefits they receive, such as mortgage home deductions and child 
tax credits.267 
In both the consumer-privacy and government-search contexts, it is tempting 
to argue that providing clear and accurate information to help people make 
informed and voluntary choices would resolve these disparities in privacy norms 
that contribute to the surveillance gap. Yet the choice-and-consent framework 
 
259. Franks, supra note 174, at 438. 
260. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (holding that “when the subject 
of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact 
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied”); see also Tracey 
Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 1, 58–62 (2008). 
261. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1980); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429, 431–32 (1991); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 194 (2001). In one study of consent 
searches during traffic stops, “none of the 90–95% of subjects who consented knew of the right to 
refuse consent, and those few who knew the law were skeptical that the officer would actually take 
no for an answer.” Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The 
Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 126, 160 (2016) (citing study). 
262. Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L. 
REV. 509, 511 (2015). 
263. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971). 
264. Id. at 326. 
265. Id. at 324. 
266. See Bach, supra note 4, at 331–32. 
267. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 24. 
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assumes that people negotiate their own privacy boundaries. In the surveillance 
gap, people have far less agency and information to strike privacy bargains in their 
interest. Many do not consent to live with the extreme forms of privacy that 
demarcate the surveillance gap. Rather, many possess little or no political voice 
or power. To the degree that individuals in the surveillance gap exercise 
autonomy, they must do so in a very narrow space that is restricted by outside 
forces. 
Compounding the problem, ideologies promoting individual choice can place 
blame on marginalized groups for their predicament. Undocumented immigrants, 
for example, choose to come to the United States. Criminals choose to commit 
crimes. Low-wage laborers choose to work by the day. Homeless people choose 
to live outside of society’s margins. Otherwise-eligible people with felony 
conviction histories are uninterested in voting. But in reality, these are highly 
constrained choices. Thousands of undocumented immigrants come to the United 
States to flee conditions such as violence, persecution, and hunger.268 Day 
laborers lack the documentation or legal status necessary to obtain work in the 
formal economy.269 People with felony conviction histories find themselves 
subject to the whim of arbitrary and often confusing state laws, some of which 
“place no restrictions” on the ability to vote from prison (as in Vermont and 
Maine),270 others of which bar people who have committed felonies from voting 
for life.271 People become homeless as rents rise and incomes fall. In this way, 
choice-and-consent frameworks are problematic for all people, are particularly 
problematic for disadvantaged populations, and are nearly useless in the 
surveillance gap. If notions of consent come to dictate our understanding of how 
people fall into the surveillance gap, we are doomed to widen it. Still, agency and 
choice go both ways: giving more choice to people in the surveillance gap can be 
a critical means of protecting their dignity and safety. 
Agency has been an important concept as privacy scholars have attempted to 
understand privacy harms and construct ways to address them. A piece of the 
agency puzzle came into focus with the important work of one scholar who 
suggests that individual choices about information flow are a matter of context. 
We turn to Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity next. 
 
268. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, When Deportation Is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER (Jan. 15, 
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence 
[https://perma.cc/ER3E-GR9P]; Vivian Yee, Kenan Davis & Jugal K. Patel, Here’s the Reality 
About Illegal Immigrants in the United States, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/06/us/politics/undocumented-illegal-immigrants
.html [https://perma.cc/GCQ9-6RW7]. 
269. See Lee, supra note 1, at 661. 
270. Brent Staples, The Racist Origins of Felon Disenfranchisement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-racist-origins-of-felon-disenfranchisemen
t.html?emc=eta1&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/J7FX-E8G5]. 
271. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; KY. CONST. § 145; see FLA. CONST. § 4. 
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D. Contextual Privacy and the Surveillance Gap 
In 2010, Helen Nissenbaum presented a resonant theory of privacy in a 
digitally connected world. She posits that what offends privacy sensibilities is not 
the sharing of information in and of itself, but the sharing of information along 
pathways different from those that a particular piece of information generally 
travels.272 For example, a doctor sharing a patient’s information with a nurse or 
another attending physician does not raise privacy hackles; a doctor sharing her 
patient’s sensitive information with a marketing agency would, for many, 
constitute a grievous privacy invasion. Nissenbaum terms this idea “contextual 
integrity.”273 Her premise is that the right of privacy boils down to the right to 
appropriate information flows.274 
Is this theory useful in understanding the surveillance gap? In one sense, fears 
of contextual integrity harms propel some people into the surveillance gap. The 
fear, for example, that immigrant data collected in one context (DACA) will be 
used in another context (deportation) is a prime reason that many undocumented 
people populate the surveillance gap. 
In another sense, the surveillance gap is hard to fit within the theory of 
contextual integrity. Nissenbaum’s work assumes an extreme information 
environment where data flows even without individual data subjects’ knowledge. 
As Nissenbaum describes it, the problem of contextual integrity arises from “the 
extraordinary surge [in the modern world] in powers to communicate, disseminate, 
distribute, disclose, and publish—generally spread—information.”275 In this 
environment, contextual integrity seeks to explain a crisis in privacy—situations 
in which privacy norms amid this massive information flow are not respected. The 
surveillance gap, however, is the inverse of out-of-control information flow: 
expected information flows between Point A and Point B are not happening at all. 
The surveillance gap is not a failure to adhere to privacy norms, but rather a 
failure—be it purposeful or accidental, benign or malignant—of data and 
information to follow the same flows for residents of the surveillance gap as 
nonresidents. This “information inequality” is a source of privacy concern.276 
Information inequality describes the problem when the holder of data has more 
information than the data subject, resulting in the data holder controlling or 
otherwise duping the data subject. For example, two people might enjoy buying 
books from an online bookseller. In collecting information about the buying habits 
of one user versus another, the online bookseller might opt to offer a discount to 
 
272. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010). 
273. Id. at 127. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 51. 
276. Jeroen van den Hoven, Privacy and the Varieties of Moral Wrong-Doing in an 
Information Age, 27 SIGCAS COMPUTERS & SOC’Y, Sept. 1997, at 33, 35; OSCAR GANDY, THE 
PANOPTIC SORT (1993). 
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one user but not the other. Both users are unaware of the benefit flowing to one 
and not the other, and both are victims of information inequality with respect to 
the information that the users have versus the information that the bookseller has. 
Information inequality in this context is problematic, akin to price 
discrimination.277 In the surveillance-gap context, information inequality results 
in data flows providing benefit to some but precluding others from receiving 
similar benefits because the provider of the benefit has no information about some 
individuals at all. 
Many of us expect that, in our modern data-driven environment, an entity, 
government or otherwise, can effortlessly grant benefits to citizens. Whether the 
benefit is healthcare, democratic participation, or a coupon for a consumer good, 
we assume that the body hoping to bestow the good or service will be able to reach 
targeted individuals to provide it. The surveillance gap disrupts this expected flow, 
not by improperly re-routing information, but by stopping the flow altogether. If 
privacy, as it is often conceived, is the ability to control access to self,278 then the 
residents of the surveillance gap have won the privacy game—they have it. But to 
the extent that residents of the surveillance gap want to assert the autonomy that a 
functioning flow of information provides, or to the extent that these surveillance 
gap residents have “privacy” as the result of an unwanted or inappropriate 
disruption in flow, Nissenbaum’s core concern is reflected. As Nissenbaum 
explains, contextual integrity is “the right to live in a world in which our 
expectations about the flow of personal information are, for the most part, met.”279 
In the case of the surveillance gap, information flow does not meet expectations 
because information does not get where it is supposed to go. Like the notice-and-
choice problem in the consumer-privacy context, residents of the surveillance gap 
cannot exercise autonomy and choice in setting the norms that define information 
flows to them and about them. 
E. Privacy, Fundamental Rights, and the Gap 
The United States Constitution does not directly afford Americans the right 
to privacy.280 In Europe, in contrast, Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of 
 
277. See, e.g., Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price 
Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y 41, 43 (2014) (exploring legal and ethical principles implicated in the use of personal 
information for the purpose of setting retail prices). 
278. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980); see 
also Westin, supra note 181, at 7 (defining privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others”). 
279. Nissenbaum, supra note 272, at 231. 
280. The United States constitutional provisions cited for protecting Americans’ privacy 
require contextual interpretation of “penumbral” rights granted under the Constitution. See Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy 
is protected from governmental intrusion.”). The Supreme Court has interpreted a constitutional right 
to privacy in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, id. at 484 (holding that the First Amendment 
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union affirmatively grant a European Union 
citizen “the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications” and “the right to the protection of personal data concerning him 
or her.”281 As a consequence, privacy in Europe is perceived as a fundamental 
human right.282 This theoretical perspective has deep implications for European 
laws ranging from aggressive libel laws to protect the dignity of persons283 to 
Europe’s strict data protection rules,284 and beyond. 
One might assume that a fundamental-rights approach to privacy would cast 
the entire European population into the surveillance gap—i.e., that its residents 
would be sheltered from surveillance because of the primacy with which 
Europeans place the right to privacy. To the contrary, recognizing privacy as a 
fundamental human right in Europe has a counterintuitive effect: no surveillance 
gap to speak of. Indeed, as one Spanish privacy law scholar put it, the idea of a 
surveillance gap in Europe is “simply unthinkable.”285 
The fundamental-rights approach to privacy can inform our understanding of 
the surveillance gap in the United States. Government surveillance in Europe is 
generally not seen as a menacing privacy invasion that threatens personal 
liberty.286 For example, one account describes the millions of European CCTV 
cameras as “a friendly eye in the sky, not Big Brother but a kindly and watchful 
uncle or aunt.”287 Viewing the state as a helpful partner, rather than as the ominous 
threat as it is often feared to be in the United States, has the effect of closing the 
surveillance gap in Europe almost entirely; this attitude defines in many ways how 
 
protects married couples’ decision-making about contraception), and Lawrence v. Texas, 530 U.S. 
558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that the Constitution implicitly grants a right to privacy even though 
such right is not explicitly enumerated). 
281. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7 & 8, 2012 O.J. C 326/391. 
282. Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The New 
Framework of the European Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605, 652 (2013). 
283. For example, London is widely referred to as the “libel capital of the world” given 
Britain’s aggressive stance on protecting individual dignity through libel law. See GEOFFREY 
ROBERTSON & ANDREW NICOL, MEDIA LAW (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the legal rights of journalists 
and broadcasters and examining publishing and reporting laws); see also Douglas W. Vick & Linda 
Macpherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the European Union, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 933, 999 (1996) 
(discussing the problem of forum shopping in libel law and the attractiveness of European libel laws 
to Americans). 
284. See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31. 
285. Email from Pablo García Mexía, Director, Revista de Privacidad y Derecho Digital, to co-
author Rebecca Green (Apr. 15, 2017, 12:16 EST) (on file with author) (responding to the question 
of whether a surveillance gap exists in Europe). 
286. Private-sector surveillance, conversely, is widely seen in Europe as a violation of 
fundamental privacy rights and is severely restricted through regimes like the European Union 
Privacy Directive (which also curbs government data collection, but which is riddled with exceptions 
to protect public safety). 
287. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 494 (2006) (quoting 
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 36 
(2004)). 
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Europeans live and interact with authorities on a daily basis and is a critical means 
by which Europeans enjoy full rights of personhood. Relatedly, most European 
countries have a larger social safety net than the United States,288 and poor people 
may thus feel that turning over personal information to the government is well 
worth the benefits obtained. 
Two aspects of European administrative practice illustrate this reality. First, 
many European countries use town registry systems to keep tabs on their citizens. 
In Austria, all people establishing residency within a town or city must register 
with the Meldebehörde for themselves and all minors in their household within 
three days of moving.289 In Belgium, new residents have eight working days to 
register at the municipal administration office/town hall (maison 
communale/gemeentehuis).290 In Italy, residents are required to inform the local 
municipality of their intention to move and their new address.291 Local 
government officials verify registrations, and failure to comply with local 
registration requirements within the deadline for doing so results in fines.292 This 
system allows European national governments to keep track of their citizens for 
purposes of public safety, administering social safety net programs, administering 
nationalized healthcare, running elections, conducting the national census, and 
many other administrative state functions.293 
 
288. ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE US AND EUROPE: A 
WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 2, 18 (2004). But see IRWIN GARFINKEL, LEE RAINWATER & TIMOTHY 
SMEEDING, WEALTH & WELFARE STATES: IS AMERICA A LAGGARD OR LEADER? 7–8 (2009) (arguing 
that if education spending is considered, the United States fares more favorably in social welfare 
spending comparisons). 
289. Registration, HELP, https://www.help.gv.at/Portal.Node/hlpd/public [https://perma.cc 
/28G6-FPEP] (last visited Dec. 6, 2017). 
290. See Moving to Belgium: Complete Guide to Belgian Visas and Permits, EXPACTICA, 
https://www.expatica.com/be/visas-and-permits/Moving-to-Belgium-Guide-to-Belgian-visas-and-
permits_100069.html#Register [https://perma.cc/H5JZ-S9QF] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018); 
Changement d’adresse, BELGIUM.BE, https://www.belgium.be/fr/logement/demenagement 
/changement_d_adresse [https://perma.cc/24VT-VJ7A] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018) (describing, in 
French, that Belgians have eight business days to declare a change of address at the population 
service (“service population”) of the new residence or face fines). 
291. See Anagrafe General Registry, FARNESINA, http://www.ambtallinn.esteri.it/ambasciata 
_tallinn/en/informazioni_e_servizi/servizi_consolari/anagrafe/ [https://perma.cc/XM93-7PBU] 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
292. See Anagrafe Italiani residenti all’estero (A.I.R.E.), FARNESINA, http://www.esteri.it/mae
/en/italiani_nel_mondo/serviziconsolari/aire.html/ [https://perma.cc/6PZG-GF8X] (last visited Jan. 
14, 2018) (describing, in Italian, the residency registration system, “Anagrafe della Popolazione 
Residente”). 
293. As in the United States, keeping track of immigrant populations poses a huge challenge 
in Europe. The International Organization for Migration estimates that 387,739 immigrants arrived 
in Europe in 2016. This figure includes apprehended immigrants (for example, those who attempted 
sea crossings). See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIXED MIGRATION FLOWS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
AND BEYOND (2016), http://migration.iom.int/docs/2016_Flows_to_Europe_Overview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R8BB-3JWA]; Migration and Migrant Population Statistics, EUROSTAT 
STATISTICS EXPLAINED (Mar. 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index
.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics&oldid=327524#Basis_for_data_collectio
n [https://perma.cc/B3QE-EJUM]; see also Phillip Connor, Illegal Migration to EU Rises for Routes 
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A second and related illustration is the widespread use of national 
identification cards in Europe.294 Many European countries require residents to 
carry identification cards. Some make the national identification card 
compulsory.295 Though national identification systems in Europe are not 
ubiquitously approved—in Great Britain, for example, national identification 
became a central campaign issue in the lead-up to the 2010 general election296—
national identification cards are nevertheless a mainstay in most European 
countries, and indeed around the world. 
In contrast, the United States does not have a compulsory (or non-
compulsory) resident registration program, nor do citizens carry a national 
identification card.297 This has caused headaches in administrative contexts, 
including voting.298 By basing our laws and norms on a liberty-centric conception 
 
Both Well-Worn and Less Traveled, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 18, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/18/illegal-migration-to-eu-rises-for-routes-both-
well-worn-and-less-traveled/ [https://perma.cc/ZKD5-8ZSE] (discussing “illegal” immigrant flows 
in Europe). The inability of European countries to reliably track immigration data predated the 
current refugee crisis. See Brian Wheeler, The Truth Behind UK Immigration Figures, BBC NEWS 
(Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-19646459 [https://perma.cc/GL4E-7PQ2] 
(“Keith Vaz, chairman of the influential home affairs committee says he finds it incredible that a 
supermarket loyalty scheme can collect and store details on the shopping habits of millions of people, 
yet a similar database can not [sic] be set up to record arrivals and departures.”). Though the system 
is imperfect, European Union trans-border surveillance is highly sophisticated. See Katja Franko 
Aas, ‘Crimmigrant’ Bodies and Bona Fide Travelers: Surveillance, Citizenship and Global 
Governance, 15(3) THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 331 (2011) (providing an overview of trans-border 
surveillance systems in the European Union). Recent proposals to add biometrics and facial 
recognition tools suggest further ramping up. See Identification of Applicants (EURODAC), 
MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum
/identification-of-applicants_en [https://perma.cc/K6DM-ZZK9] (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) 
(describing EuroDac, biometric data collection of asylum seekers); EUROSUR, FRONTEX, 
http://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/eurosur/ [https://perma.cc/4YLB-6D4T] (last visited Dec. 6, 
2017) (describing EuroSur, drone and satellite surveillance programs).  
294. See David Lyon, National ID Card Systems and Social Sorting: International Public 
Opinion, in SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION, 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS (Elia Zureik, Lynda Harling-Stalker, Emily Smith, David Lyon & 
Yolande E. Chan eds., 2010). 
295. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, among others, maintain compulsory 
identification laws. See Kevin Drum, The Quick Way to End the Vote-Fraud Wars? A National ID 
Card, MOTHER JONES 2 (July/Aug. 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/national-
id-card-voter-fraud-solution/# [https://perma.cc/TXX4-QNEG]. 
296. Edgar A. Whitley & Gus Hosein, GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOR IDENTITY POLICIES (2010); 
HISTORIES OF STATE SURVEILLANCE IN EUROPE AND BEYOND 211–15 (Kees Boersma, Rosamunde 
van Brakel, Chiara Fonio & Pieter Wagenaar eds., 2014). 
297. See Jonathan Weinberg, Demanding Identity Papers, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 197 (2005) 
(describing longstanding resistance to national identification in the United States); ELECTRONIC 
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW: FEW BENEFITS, STAGGERING COSTS 1 (May 
2008), https://epic.org/privacy/id_cards/epic_realid_0508.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XYQ-6BJ2] 
(noting that throughout its history, the United States “rejected the idea of a national identification 
system”). 
298. Maintaining accurate voting lists presents an enormous challenge when individuals who 
move from one state to another suffer no consequence for failing to remove their name from the 
voter list in the state from which they moved, not to mention registering to vote in their new location. 
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of privacy, Americans forgo the civic protections that a fundamental rights-based 
orientation offers. This lack of civic and legal protection plagues members of the 
surveillance gap. The next part explores potential ways to address the surveillance 
gap’s worst consequences. 
IV. 
BRIDGING THE SURVEILLANCE GAP 
One potential fix for the harms that stem from the surveillance gap—at least 
if Europe’s experience is a guide—is surely out of reach: wholesale adoption of a 
fundamental rights theory of privacy. Socio-cultural norms are undoubtedly too 
ingrained to undo American aversion to state surveillance and cataloging of the 
populace. Nevertheless, a dignity-based understanding of privacy may allow for a 
reduction of the ill effects of the surveillance gap, as described below. 
Closing the surveillance gap is difficult significantly because Americans want 
their liberty to be let alone.299 For many Americans, the existence of the 
surveillance gap is a manifestation of liberty. They may see the surveillance gap 
not as a problem, but as an outgrowth of a value that Americans hold dear: the 
right to disappear. 
Additionally, the surveillance gap is a complex space, and one set of solutions 
is unlikely to address the contextualized harms that arise within it. It exists for 
multiple reasons, ranging from bias on the part of government actors, to economic 
advantage for employers, to the choice to remain by surveillance gap residents in 
the face of oppressive state systems or societal neglect. People in the surveillance 
gap constitute a huge cross-section of American society and hold diverse goals 
and interests. Even within the same sub-category of surveillance gap inhabitants, 
interests may diverge. For example, while many Virginians with felony conviction 
histories are thrilled to be “found” when it comes to regaining the right vote, others 
prefer to eschew all interaction with the state—including voting.300 Indeed, being 
counted is not necessarily a solution to extreme privacy because it can bring people 
into systems that are themselves harmful without transforming those systems.301 
Finally, “solutions” to the surveillance gap are difficult to pinpoint because 
the causes of the surveillance gap are wildly intractable. Poverty, discrimination, 
 
The result is massively bloated and inaccurate voter rolls that feed fraud accusations haunting the 
American system. See Richard Hasen, THE VOTING WARS 200 (2012) (proposing national voter 
registration and national voter identification). 
299. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 177, at 193. 
300. One of the co-authors has experienced through her work on the Revive My Vote hotline 
at William & Mary Law School, REVIVE MY VOTE, supra note 147, that many applicants are joyful 
to receive word that their voting rights have been restored, and some even break into tears of joy. 
Volunteers conducting outreach for Revive My Vote occasionally interact with individuals who are 
hostile to the idea of voting. 
301. See SPADE, supra note 199, at 86–87 (encouraging a “move[] away from an uncritical call 
to ‘be counted’ by the administrative mechanisms of violent systems” and instead recommending 
strategizing “our interventions on these systems with an understanding of their operations and of 
their tendencies to add new categories of legibility as methods of expanding their control”). 
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economic subjugation, and social control all feed the surveillance gap’s existence. 
If the surveillance gap is a consequence of these much larger forces, perhaps it is 
no more “solvable” than these large and deeply embedded social ills. 
With these complexities in mind, this section offers measures that might, at 
least at the margins, address the ill effects of the surveillance gap. Our suggestions 
hinge on the dual concepts of resilience and resistance. With regard to resilience, 
Martha Fineman has explained how vulnerability is a universal and inevitable 
human condition; for instance, we all face periods in life when we are children, 
ill, or victims of accidents or disasters.302 Yet American law is built on the notion 
of an autonomous individual without communal ties or responsibilities.303 
Fineman thus urges creation of a “responsive state” that actively invests in 
enhancing the resilience of its vulnerable citizens.304 In her view, resilience is 
“what provides an individual with the means and ability to recover from harm, 
setbacks, and the misfortunes that affect her or his life.”305 Resilience is “largely 
dependent on the quality and quantity of resources or assets that he or she has at 
their disposal or command.”306 In turn, these resources are “accrued . . . within an 
array of social structures and institutions over which individuals may have little, 
if any control.”307 Currently, people in the surveillance gap show tremendous 
resilience in staying afloat, often through family and community support and 
sharply honed survival skills. Yet from a societal perspective, they are denied 
resources—such as education, job access, affordable housing, fair pay, or a voice 
in our democracy—that would build their resilience and ability to live with 
dignity, without fear or hardship. People in the surveillance gap currently develop 
resilience in the face of a restrained state, not with the support of a responsive 
state.308 
Resistance is another key element of bringing privacy into balance. Scholars 
have long noted how heavily-surveilled populations resist in subtle ways. Gilliom 
in his study of Appalachian welfare mothers described how welfare recipients 
resist government surveillance by seeking cash-only jobs to supplement their 
 
302. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM. 1, 8–9 (2008). 
303. Id. at 5, 19. (“Our current system has been built upon myths of autonomy and 
independence and thus fails to reflect the vulnerable as well as dependent nature of the human 
condition.”). 
304. Id. at 13–15. 
305. Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference—The Restrained State, 66 ALA. L. 
REV. 609, 622 (2015). 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 623. 
308. As an example, Fineman points to LGBT youth, who suffer high rates of homelessness, 
child welfare placements, and suicide due in part to a legal system that “valoriz[es] family privacy, 
parental rights, individual liberty, and choice.” Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, 
and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 307, 309, 322 (2014); id. at 313 (“Looking at the 
child within the family from a vulnerability perspective makes it apparent that it is time to rend this 
veil of privacy and bring the child into focus as a political and legal subject who, independent of the 
family, deserves the attention and protection of law and policy.”). 
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income, accepting gifts such as diapers from family and friends, and taking similar 
steps to “quietly meet the needs of their dependents through daily actions that defy 
the commands of the state.”309 Similarly, studies find that call-center employees 
resist surveillance by pretending to talk on the phone, leaving call lines open 
without customers on the line, and misleading customers.310 Gilliom envisions a 
future in which “[e]veryday tactics of evasion, subterfuge, and concealment, then, 
may very well become a defining form of politics in the surveillance society.”311 
These tactics also describe daily survival in the surveillance gap. However, 
resistance within the surveillance gap can also look diametrically different; it often 
means coming into the sunshine. To climb out of the surveillance gap, 
marginalized groups benefit from organizing and demanding that they be seen. 
Some examples are illustrative. For day laborers, one of the most effective forms 
of resistance to the surveillance gap has been organizing through worker 
centers,312 “community-based and community-led organizations that engage in a 
combination of service, advocacy, and organizing to provide support to low-wage 
workers.”313 Worker centers fill a regulatory and union gap. There are at least 150 
of them, and they aim to engage workers in collective action within a social justice 
frame.314 One common strategy is to target employers who engage in wage theft 
by “calling employers and asking them to pay, filing wage claims, and picketing 
when they don’t.”315 These actions have targeted small employers as well as major 
chains such as Taco Bell, which was the subject of a boycott to improve working 
conditions and wages for tomato pickers.316 Worker-center efforts have also been 
successful in coordinating enforcement with government agencies and enacting 
beneficial local and state legislation, such as a New York Unpaid Wages Law that 
increased the penalties on employers for wage theft.317 
Most recently, a worker center in Jackson Heights, New York developed a 
smartphone app called Jornalera, which means “day laborer,” that allows workers 
to track their hours and pay, take and upload pictures of work sites and employers, 
and share this information for legal and advocacy efforts.318 Using technology is 
 
309. GILLIOM, supra note 4, at 111. 
310. Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1409–10. 
311. GILLIOM, supra note 4, at 101. 
312. See generally Kimberly M. Sánchez Ocasio & Leo Gertner, Fighting for the Common 
Good: How Low-Wage Workers’ Identities Are Shaping Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 503 
(2017), www.yalelawjournal.com/forum/fighting-for-the common-good [https://perma.cc/ZV5Q-
DS9N] (discussing successful organizing strategies for day laborers). 
313. Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50 N.Y. 
L. REV. 417, 419 (2005–2006). 
314. Id. at 431, 438; see also Héctor R. Cordero-Guzmán, Worker Centers, Worker Center 
Networks, and the Promise of Protections for Low-Wage Workers, 18 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 31, 45 (2015). 
315. Fine, supra note 313, at 434. 
316. Id. at 435. 
317. Id. at 436–37. 
318. Liz Robbins, New Weapon in Day Laborers’ Fight Against Wage Theft: A Smartphone 
App, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/nyregion/new-weapon-in-
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a particularly powerful way to increase the autonomy of day laborers, who are in 
the best position to gauge the level of privacy that they want to retain or shed.319 
Overall, worker centers “provide the necessary mechanisms to increase the 
transparency of the hiring process, effectively monitor employment conditions, 
and provide opportunities for worker incorporation into the formal economy.”320 
Day laborers who take advantage of worker centers are also associated with higher 
rates of social inclusion and reduced isolation.321 Despite these successes, the vast 
majority of day laborers are not served by worker centers, and worker centers 
struggle to maintain funding.322 Further, the Trump administration is expected to 
impose restrictions on worker centers to limit their effectiveness, such as 
limitations on protest activities.323 Still, traditional organizing tools and new 
technologies hold promise for day laborers in resisting the surveillance gap. 
Additional, powerful examples of resistance to the surveillance gap arise in 
the context of homelessness. Homeless people have used their visibility as a way 
to fight the surveillance gap. For instance, in Seattle, a coalition of shelters and 
tent camps called SHARE/WHEEL fought the city’s proposed HMIS mandatory 
tracking system by threatening to move all residents into public parks.324 HMIS, 
which gathers data about homeless persons for the ostensible purpose of assessing 
needs and coordinating services, has been critiqued for presuming that 
homelessness is a personal pathology created by poor life choices that requires 
state intervention and management.325 Moreover, while HMIS captures data about 
 
day-laborers-fight-against-wage-theft-a-smartphone-app.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2ANG-
8X23]. 
319. See Julia Ticona, New Apps Like Jornalero Aim to Protect Low-Income Workers. Here’s 
How They Could Backfire, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Mar. 21, 2016, 11:18 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/03/21/new_apps_like_jornalero_aim_to_protect_lo
w_income_workers_here_s_how_they.html [https://perma.cc/5WKA-XJBD] (pointing out that 
potential shortcomings to this approach include a lack of consistent Internet access, unrealistic 
expectations of documentation for all wage theft claims, and potential capture of data by government 
surveillance). 
320. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 73, at 836. Worker centers 
also have a positive impact on wages. See id. at 849. 
321. M. Anne Visser, From Economic Integration to Socioeconomic Inclusion: Day Labor 
Worker Centers as Social Intermediaries, 38 URB. GEOGRAPHY 243, 260 (2017). 
322. See Cordero-Guzmán, supra note 314, at 52; Lee, supra note 1, at 661; ON THE CORNER, 
supra note 68, at 22–23 (citing a 2002 survey showing that only ten percent of day laborers in the 
New York metropolitan area have turned to worker centers for assistance). Worker centers also face 
the risk that if they are too successful, “they will be categorized as labor organizations and subjected 
to the restrictions imposed by the labor laws.” Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, 
Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 561, 580 (2014). 
323. Chris Opfer & Jasmine Ye Han, Worker Centers May Get Closer Look Under Trump, 
BNA DAILY LAB. REP. (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/worker-centers-may-n57982083896/ 
[https://perma.cc/5ZZK-EG8L]. 
324. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 843.  
325. See id. at 852. “What is more, appearing unkempt, carrying one’s belongings, and sleeping 
on park benches have long been considered lifestyle choices, rather than survival strategies.” 
Langegger, supra note 121, at 1039. 
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services used, it does not allow homeless persons to identify their own needs.326 
Thus, for the Seattle movement, members sought “to maintain a space outside the 
gaze of the state wherein the presumption of the pathology could be both avoided 
and contested.”327 The homeless individuals were less concerned about data 
privacy (a pre-occupation of wealthier Americans when it comes to big data 
collection), than about evading the stigma of homelessness. For this reason, Tony 
Sparks argues that privacy rights are not simply carried by individuals; they also 
populate physical space.328 Ultimately, the protest was successful. After lengthy 
mediations, the city adopted an “opt-in” version of HMIS that did not require 
individuals to offer information to receive services or require shelters to 
participate as a funding condition.329 
A project in Ann Arbor, Michigan involved having homeless people 
photograph their everyday lives “as a way to document their struggles and 
strengths . . . and to reach policy makers and the broader public about issues of 
concern to homeless people.”330 This project was part of a health-promotion 
strategy called photovoice—with roots in feminist theory, documentary 
photography, and critical education—which helps people to see connections 
between their individual situations and root causes and to devise strategies for 
change.331 Participants were recruited from local shelters and trained not only in 
photographic methods, but also in the ethics and power dynamics involved in 
photographing other people.332 After the photo shoots, participants discussed the 
content and context of their photographs, and the photos they selected were 
featured in local media, a gallery exhibition, and a forum at a public theater.333 
Policy makers were surprised to learn that people living in shelters sometimes held 
multiple jobs,334 and they had to confront the way that homeless people perceived 
the building of a new homeless shelter on the outskirts of town.335 This process of 
making their lives visible was powerful for the homeless participants—they 
reported improvements to their self-esteem and quality of life and spoke of the 
 
326. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 853. 
327. Id. at 855. 
328. See id. at 854–55. 
329. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 857–58. The victory is “bittersweet” given that the outcome 
might lessen federal funding for homeless services in Seattle. See id. at 858. 
330. Caroline C. Wang, Jennifer L. Cash & Lisa S. Powers, Who Knows the Streets as Well as 
the Homeless? Promoting Personal and Community Action Through Photovoice, 1 HEALTH 
PROMOTION PRAC. 81, 81–82 (2000). 
331. See id. at 82. 
332. See id. at 83. 
333. See id. at 84. 
334. See id. at 85. 
335. See id. (“The photovoice project did not substantively affect these plans [to build a 
homeless shelter on the outskirts of town] but enabled board members, planners, community people, 
and community leaders to rethink issues from the perspective of the homeless.”). 
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ability to define their own lives outside the parameters that society placed on 
them.336 
Homeless people’s visibility has led to the development of formal tactics to 
render them invisible. Nevertheless, from within the surveillance gap, homeless 
persons have resisted by re-asserting their visibility. In turn, “the presence of 
visible poverty forces society to confront inequality of income, education, health 
care, and criminal justice.”337 Ultimately, homeless people need autonomy to set 
their own privacy boundaries, a power that wealthier Americans already possess. 
“[W]hat homeless people . . . need more of is both publicity—through which their 
needs can be recognized as legitimate—and privacy—through which they can 
protect themselves from absorption and de-legitimization from the public.”338 
Striking this balance is essential for other people in the surveillance gap as 
well. Marginalized people tend to live at privacy’s extremes. At either end of the 
spectrum, people lack control over their personal information and the degree to 
which they interact with mainstream institutions. Strategies that give people the 
autonomy to assert or shed privacy are essential to their individual dignity and to 
fulfilling our communal, democratic promise. The examples above show that 
grassroots organizing, driven by the objectives and insights of affected groups, 
can be powerful in enhancing autonomy. Professionals working with marginalized 
populations, such as social workers, lawyers, and community organizers, can 
assist in these grassroots movements by providing support to a group’s self-
defined goals. Education about legal rights, remedies, and risks can help people in 
the surveillance gap make wise decisions about how to live their lives. For 
instance, many ex-felons in Virginia are unaware that they have the restored right 
to vote; without that knowledge, they cannot exercise an informed opinion about 
whether to register. Likewise, new technologies—as simple as a smartphone 
application—can be effective in helping people strike a privacy balance that 
calibrates to their needs. 
In addition, some states have been receptive to building the resilience of 
undocumented persons. Consider, for instance, the twelve states, along with the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, that allow undocumented immigrants to 
receive driver’s licenses and obtain insurance, so that they can drive, to work and 
elsewhere, without breaking the law.339 Certain states and localities are limiting 
 
336. See id. at 85–86. 
337. Rankin, supra note 105, at 52. 
338. Sparks, supra note 105, at 850 (quoting Ted Kilian, Public and Private, Power and Space, 
in PHILOSOPHY AND GEOGRAPHY II: THE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SPACE 115, 125 (Andrew Light & 
Jonathan M. Smith eds., 1998)). 
339. See Liz Robbins, For the Undocumented, a Broken Headlight Can Lead to Deportation, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/nyregion/driving-illegal-
immigration-trump-administration.html [https://perma.cc/WJ9T-8MM4] (“As many as 12 states, 
along with the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, offer driver’s licenses for unauthorized 
immigrants, up from three in 2010.”); see also Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 58 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 765, 822–23 (2017) (discussing states that grant driver’s licenses and higher education 
benefits to recipients of DACA). Such a driver’s license law “had a transformative effect on the lives 
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their law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities “in 
furtherance of important state interests involving their immigrant 
communities.”340 These jurisdictions believe that their sanctuary stance enhances 
public safety by encouraging immigrants to report crimes and by allocating 
spending toward crime fighting rather than illegal-immigrant search 
expeditions.341 In the current polarized political climate, advocacy at the state and 
local level can sometimes be more fruitful in law reforms that aid marginalized 
communities. 
Lawyers should continue to develop robust visions of positive, constitutional 
social rights, despite the current conception of a Constitution that protects 
individuals only against government interference342 and thus fails those living in 
the surveillance gap. In the 1960s and 1970s, a legal movement for constitutional 
social and economic rights led the Court to adopt procedural due process rights to 
protect governmental benefits and to invoke statutory interpretations that 
increased access to benefits.343 While the Court became more conservative and 
ultimately pulled back from an emerging theory of minimum social 
entitlements,344 the future may cycle back, giving way to a more responsive state 
that pulls marginalized persons into the mainstream.345 
The first step in tackling the problems of the surveillance gap is to recognize 
its existence and to acknowledge the harms it produces. From there, we can 
integrate it into privacy discussions and create tools that enable residents of the 
surveillance gap to fight against its worst consequences and to access social 
supports on their own terms. 
 
of its undocumented immigrant beneficiaries, enabling them to drive without fear of being stopped 
by state or local police, arrested, detained, or fined, and thereby facilitating their daily access to 
work, friends, and family.” Id. at 836. 
340. See Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2016). Four states and about 633 counties have these policies. Jasmine 
C. Lee, Rudy Omri & Julia Preston, What Are Sanctuary Cities?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cities.html [https://perma.cc/5RNB-
WYHB]. 
341. See Armacost, supra note 340, at 1201. 
342. See generally Sotirios A. Barber, Fallacies of Negative Constitutionalism, 75 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 651, 651–52 (2006); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
2271 (1990). 
343. See William Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 1969–
Present, 39 TULSA L. REV. 597, 606–12 (2013) (describing the Court’s doctrine in this era and 
influence of legal scholars Frank Michelman and Charles Reich). 
344. Id. at 612. 
345. Cf. Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 210, 
247 (2008) (arguing that the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of welfare rights depends on 
evolving societal norms). 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
The current narrative within privacy law is that privacy is dead, or at least on 
life support. The loss of privacy threatens people’s sense of self and engagement 
in self-expression. Poor people and members of minority groups face great privacy 
incursions and may be subject to increasing forms of big-data discrimination. This 
article shines a light on a countervailing reality—the harms of having too much 
privacy in a society in which attachment to mainstream data streams, resources, 
and institutions is necessary to thrive. Many undocumented persons, day laborers, 
homeless persons, people with conviction histories, and others live within a 
surveillance gap, yet this phenomenon is rarely acknowledged in privacy 
discourse. The harms within the surveillance gap are serious, encompassing 
physical and mental injuries, big-data marginalization, economic instability, and 
loss of democratic participation. Like surveillance, the surveillance gap is a form 
of social control. It keeps people down. 
In response, people living in the surveillance gap have shown incredible 
resilience, surviving day-to-day by engaging in multiple forms of resistance. But 
small triumphs do not transform the structural inequalities that perpetuate the gap. 
Accordingly, a vision of privacy and a framework for privacy law that balances 
the privacy interests of all persons and that does not simply reflect the assumed 
desires and needs of elites is needed. Marginalized communities should have a 
role in shaping a balanced vision of privacy that recognizes both the benefits and 
costs of privacy in differing contexts. Too little privacy is bad, but so is too much. 
The key going forward is to get the balance right. 
